Procedural Retrenchment and the States by Clopton, Zachary D.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
4-2018
Procedural Retrenchment and the States
Zachary D. Clopton
Cornell Law School, zdc6@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the
Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zachary D. Clopton, "Procedural Retrenchment and the States," 106 California Law Review 411 (2018)
Procedural Retrenchment and the States
Zachary D. Clopton*
Although not always headline grabbing, the Roberts Court has
been highly interested in civil procedure. According to critics, the
Court has undercut access to justice and private enforcement through
its decisions on pleading, class actions, summary judgment,
arbitration, standing, personal jurisdiction, and international law.
While I have much sympathy for the Court's critics, the current
discourse too often ignores the states. Rather than bemoaning the
Roberts Court's decisions to limit court access-and despairing
further developments in the age of Trump-we instead might
productively focus on the options open to state courts and public
enforcement. Many of the aforementioned decisions are not binding on
state courts, and many states have declined to follow their reasoning.
This Article documents state courts deviating from Twombly and Iqbal
on pleading; the Celotex trilogy on summary judgment; Wal-Mart v.
Dukes on class actions; and Supreme Court decisions on standing and
international law. Similarly, many of the Court's highly criticized
procedural decisions do not apply to public enforcement, and many
public suits have proceeded where private litigation would have failed.
This Article documents successful state-enforcement actions when
class actions could not be certified, when individual claims would be
sent to arbitration, and when private plaintiffs would lack Article III
standing.
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In sum, this Article evaluates state court and state-enforcement
responses to the Roberts Court's procedural decisions, and it suggests
further interventions by state courts and public enforcers that could
offset the regression in federal court access. At the same time, this
analysis also illuminates serious challenges for those efforts, and it
offers reasons to be cautious about state procedure and enforcement.
Leveling down to state actors may not completely escape the political
forces that have shapedfederal procedure, and it may exacerbate some
of the political economies that have undermined private enforcement
and private rights to date.
Introduction ........................................ 413
I. Procedural Retrenchment in the Roberts Court .......... ..... 416
II. Civil Procedure in State Courts .................................423
A. Federal Rules in State Courts ..................... 424
1. Pleading ........................................424
2. Summary Judgment ..............................427
3. Class Actions ............................ 432
B. Standing in State Courts .............................434
C. International Law in State Courts .......................438
D. Personal Jurisdiction in State Courts ......................... 441
E. State Court Assessment ..............................442
III. Civil Procedure and State Enforcement ............. ...... 445
A. Class Action Substitutes ....................... 446
1. Attorney General Suits ............................ 446
2. Private Attorney General Suits ...... ... ................ 450
B. Arbitration Substitutes .................. ...... 453
C. Standing Substitutes .......................... 458
D. International Law Substitutes .......... ........ 459
E. Personal Jurisdiction Substitutes ........... .......... 460
F. State-Enforcement Assessment............... ..... 461
IV. The Politics of Procedure. ...................... ...... 464
A. Reasons for Optimism ................................464
B. Reasons for Concern ...................................467
Conclusion ...................................................469
Appendix 1 ................................... ..... 471
Appendix 2 ................................... ..... 476
PROCEDURAL RETRENCHMENT AND THE STATES
INTRODUCTION
Although not always headline grabbing, the Roberts Court has been highly
interested in civil procedure. And, at least in some quarters, it has been seen as
brutally effective in pursuing substantive values through its civil procedure
decision-making. 2 In the words of Dean Erwin Chemerinsky:
One crucial aspect of the Roberts Court's decision making has been its
systematically closing the courthouse doors to those suing corporations,
to those suing the government, to criminal defendants, and to plaintiffs
in general. Taken together, these separate decisions have had a great
cumulative impact in denying access to the courts to those who claim
that their rights have been violated. The Roberts Court often has been
able to achieve substantive results favored by conservatives through
these procedural devices.3
According to critics such as Chemerinsky, the Roberts Court has undercut
access to justice and private enforcement through a host of decisions relating to
pleading, class actions, summary judgment, arbitration, standing, personal
jurisdiction, and international law. 4 These decisions are consistent with the
recent history of "plaintiphobia" in the Supreme Court.5 And the election of
Donald Trump does not bode well for reversals in these areas.
While I have much sympathy for these normative critiques, we should not
read the Supreme Court's decisions on private federal litigation for more than
they are worth. Many of the Court's procedural decisions leave open important
opportunities in the states. Consider the following examples from state courts:
* Twombly and Iqbal introduced "plausibility pleading" into
federal procedure, but judges in nineteen states expressly
rejected this new pleading standard-not to mention other state
judges who have rejected the Celotex trilogy on summary
judgment, Wal-Mart v. Dukes on class actions, and others;
* The Supreme Court tightened restrictions on Article III
1. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31
REv. LrrIG. 313 (2012); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 123 (2015).
2. See infra Part I (collecting sources).
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REv. 317, 317 (2012).
4. See infra Part I (collecting cases). Access to justice refers to the ability of individuals or
groups to seek and obtain a remedy through institutions of law. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). Private enforcement refers to a subset of civil cases in which "government
responds to a perception of unremedied systemic problems by creating or modifying a regulatory regime
and relying in whole or in part on private actors as enforcers." Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 637, 639-40 (2013). These concepts often (though not
always) run together. See infra note 453.
5. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 193 (2014) (discussing decisions ofthe Roberts and Rehnquist Courts that are adverse
to plaintiff interests).
6. Cf Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part H: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
971 (2017) (observing respite from the hostility toward class actions in the eight-member Court).
7. See infra Part II.A.
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standing, but state courts with looser standing rules have heard
claims under Section 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and other federal laws when there would have been no
standing in federal court;8 and
* Medellin v. Texas declined to require evidentiary hearings for
habeas petitioners claiming violations of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, but courts in at least two
states, as a matter of state law, have ordered such hearings to
vindicate the United States' international law commitments.
Or, consider the following examples of state public enforcement:
* A federal district court denied class certification in a suit
against H & R Block regarding Refund Anticipation Loans
(RALs), but the decision mentioned that public enforcement
was available-and a state later sued H & R Block over its
RALs program;10
* In various decisions, the Supreme Court has made it more
difficult for individuals who signed arbitration clauses to
vindicate their rights in court, but public enforcers have
succeeded with court actions despite arbitration clauses;' and
* A federal court in California recently relied on Dukes to deny
certification for an employment class action, but it allowed the
named plaintiff to proceed on behalf of employees for "private
attorney general" claims under California law.12
The aforementioned examples are not to suggest that the states stand in
complete opposition to the Supreme Court-far from it.13 Instead, this Article
identifies potential state responses to the apparent regression in federal court
access, and it evaluates the extent to which state courts and public enforcers have
engaged in these responses to date. If state courts and public enforcement are not
the battlegrounds of the "litigation state,, 14 they will be soon. These
developments also connect with recent interest in the states as counterweights to
a unified federal government after the 2016 election.15
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra notes 313-314 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part llI.B.
12. See infra notes 352-356 and accompanying text. In note 295, I explain why I label this
private suit as "public enforcement."
13. This also does not suggest that state courts and public enforcers can replace everything lost
to the Supreme Court's procedural decisions. See infra Parts IIE, IH.F & IV.B.
14. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U. S. (2010).
15. See, e.g., Vivian Yee, To Combat Trump, Democrats Ready a G.O.P. Tactic: Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2hPAdl3 [https://perma.cc/CT59-QTVJ]; cf David J. Barron,
Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2009) (discussing
liberal interest in states during the George W. Bush administration); Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or
Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 33 (2009) (same).
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This Article thus aims to reorient the conversation away from an exclusive
focus on federal procedure and toward other avenues for access to justice and
private enforcement. While this approach departs from a federal court focus, it
is consistent with two other themes in the literature. First, this Article takes
seriously the emphasis on public, precedential court adjudication.16 The
alternatives discussed below are court-based. Second, this Article takes seriously
the central role of litigation in the American regulatory state.17 The discussion
here addresses the enforcement of public and private laws alike.
In so doing, this study pursues a series of interrelated goals. Proponents of
court access and private enforcement, and their allies in the states, might see in
this Article a roadmap for further interventions if they feel stymied by the federal
courts. Their opponents, too, might follow the same map to locate future
confrontations. Thus, these procedural developments raise the stakes for state
courts and state enforcement. My effort to identify potential responses outside
of the federal courts also provides a baseline against which we can evaluate
judicial and political actors: is the Roberts Court an outlier, or are its views
consistent with a broader plaintiphobia?l 9 Even when the Court lacks de jure
authority, do its decisions have de facto sway?
While this review surfaces opportunities for state courts and state
enforcement, it also highlights their formal and functional limits-and it
connects those opportunities and limits to procedural politics.20 Only a careful
study of the Supreme Court's procedural jurisprudence reveals where doctrinal
limits end and practical limits begin. Or, to put it another way, sometimes it is
the Supreme Court that impairs court access and private enforcement, but other
times the problems come from resource constraints, preemption, or politics.
More generally, thinking clearly about the potential role for states raises
questions about the political economy of procedural federalism-and, as
explained below, such shifts to state courts and state enforcement may come with
unintended risks.
Filling out this analysis, Part I of this Article briefly describes the major
procedural decisions of the Roberts Court. Part II documents state court
responses to those decisions, and Part III explores state public enforcement.
Many of these areas have been unexplored by scholars, and this Article is the
first to pull them together in one place. Based on these inquiries, Part IV offers
16. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private ofArbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure ofRights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
17. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 14; Burbank et al., supra note 4.
18. See, e.g., infra Part IV.B (discussing selection of state judges and executive enforcers).
19. Burbank and Farhang suggest that Supreme Court hostility toward private enforcement has
not tracked the public mood. STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT:
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 192-214 (2017).
20. Cf Burt Neubome, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (assessing state and
federal courts in an earlier era).
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some conclusions in light of the values of federalism and the politics of
procedure.
In short, this Article calls for new attention on state court and public-
enforcement responses to federal procedural retrenchment. Such responses are
multifarious and have the potential to be effective. But this Article also
illuminates serious challenges facing those efforts, and it suggests reasons to be
cautious about the politics of state procedure and enforcement.
I.
PROCEDURAL RETRENCHMENT IN THE ROBERTS COURT
A central theme of this Article is that analyses of the Supreme Court's civil
procedure decisions have been too focused on the federal courts, to the exclusion
of state courts and public enforcement. Before exploring that claim further, it is
helpful to review the decisions at the core of this critique. Many of these
decisions are widely known, so this Section only briefly surveys the major civil
procedure decisions of the Roberts Court21 and offers a sample of the criticism
these decisions have engendered.
Pleading. To lawyers and law students, the most well-known procedural
decisions of the Roberts Court are Bell Atlantic v. Twombly22 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.23 Prior to 2007, the federal courts employed a system of "notice pleading"
under which plaintiffs were required to plead only enough facts to put defendants
on notice of the claims against them.24 Twombly and Iqbal reoriented federal
pleading around "plausibility." Plaintiffs are now required to plead facts that
25
show a "plausible" claim and a "reasonable" possibility of success.
This is not the place to adjudicate the intense empirical debate about the
effects of Twombly and Iqbal,26 but two facts seem clear. First, Twombly and
Iqbal announced a change as a matter of doctrine. 27 Second, this doctrinal change
precipitated substantial criticism, particularly from those focused on private
enforcement and access to justice. Scholars have referred to these decisions as
"attacks on American democracy,"28 "subversions of law to achieve the
21. One issue not addressed here is statutory preemption of state substantive law. I exclude those
decisions as "substantive," though they have significant consequences for jurisdiction and court access.
Cf infra Part II.E (discussing subject-matter jurisdiction and removal).
22. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
23. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
24. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
25. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
26. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (collecting empirical sources); Jonah B. Gelbach, Material
Facts in the Debate over Twombly and lqbal, 68 STAN. L. REv. 369 (2016) (same).
27. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1337, 1371 (2010) ("The change in pleading, unless somehow undone, represents a truly major
development in modem procedure.").
28. Steven B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARv. CR-C.L. L. REV. 399, 405 (2011).
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restrictive ends of societal elites," 29 "threaten[ing] to undermine civil rights
enforcement, compromise court access, and incentivize unethical conduct,"3 0
and "mark[ing] a continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, private
enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of
corporate interests and concentrated wealth.'31 One scholar chose Iqbal for a
symposium entitled "The Worst Supreme Court Case Ever?" 32 I could go on.33
Summary Judgment. To the extent that Twombly and Iqbal have a parallel
in summary judgment, it would be the Rehnquist Court's decisions in the Celotex
trilogy. 34 Like Twombly and Iqbal, the Celotex trilogy made the law friendlier to
pretrial disposition and provoked backlash among commentators.35 The Roberts
Court has engaged with summary judgment as well. Although known primarily
for its treatment of video evidence, Scott v. Harris may have consequences for
the law of summary judgment.36 The Supreme Court explained in Scott that the
non-moving party is not entitled to traditional summary judgment deference if
its position "blatantly contradicts" the record.37 Professor Wolff has explained
that this language represents a change in the prevailing federal standard with the
potential to "erode the pathway to trial for plaintiffs in every type of dispute."3 8
29. A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185,201 (2010).
30. Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 65(2010).
31. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
ofCivil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010).
32. Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and
Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 573 (2012) (appearing in a symposium titled "The Worst
Supreme Court Case Ever?"). Professor Subrin's essay began: "Ashcroft v. Iqbal is an embarrassment
to the American Judicial System in which a majority of the Supreme Court chose to reject the rule of
law." Id at 571 (footnote omitted).
33. See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest
Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court's Disregard for Claims ofDiscrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV.
419 (2010).
34. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Celotes lowered
the burden of production on the moving party and increased the burden on the non-movant.
35. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
"Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the
General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1731 (2014); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of
the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005).
36. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
37. Id at 372.
38. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott v. Harris and the Future ofSummary Judgment, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1351, 1354 (2015). Wolff added that Scott "appears to erase the presumption in favor of non-moving
parties altogether." Id. at 1352.
2018] 417
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The effects of Scott are seemingly less severe than Twombly and Iqbal.3 But at
least according to Wolff, "the parallels are ominous."40
Class Actions. The Supreme Court has also retrenched in class action law.41
Though perhaps properly understood as a Title VII decision, the Roberts Court's
best-known class action ruling came in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.42 The Dukes majority
required that a putative class establish the capacity to generate "common
answers," not just "common questions."43 The decision raised the evidentiary
burden on plaintiffs to affirmatively establish this commonality, demanding
"convincing" facts where they were not demanded before.4 Two years later, the
Roberts Court called for a similar "rigorous analysis" of Rule 23's predominance
requirement in Comcast Corporation. v. Behrend.45
Criticism of Dukes and Behrend has been widespread as well.46 Class
actions have facilitated access to justice and private enforcement, especially for
low-value claims.4 7 In this light, scholars have explained that Dukes limits
"access to courts" and creates "new impediments" to private enforcement;48
"compromises employees' access to justice";49 "undermines the rights of
workplace discrimination victims";50 and demonstrates "the Court's willingness
of late to place policy above principle in ways that restrict access to justice."51
39. Compare id. at 1365-67 (collecting federal cases applying Scott), with supra notes 22-33
(discussing Twombly and Iqbal).
40. Wolff, supra note 38, at 1385.
41. I will treat separately class action decisions regarding arbitration, although those decisions
have consequences for class actions as well. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest, 133 S.
Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a
Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be
dismantled."). Another class action case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. AllstateIns. Co., 559
U.S. 393 (2010), is better understood as an Erie decision, thus it does not fit perfectly in this analysis.
See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (holding that Rule 23 determines the
requirements of a state law class action in federal court despite conflicting state law); Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming
the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010).
42. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
43. Id at 350. I focus here on Dukes's effect on "commonality." See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(aX2).
44. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359.
45. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
46. See, e.g., Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, The Hazards of Dukes: The Substantive
Consequences ofa Procedural Decision, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 123 (2012) (collecting sources).
47. See generally Burbank et al., supra note 4 (discussing private enforcement and connecting
it to, inter alia, class actions).
48. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 153 (2011).
49. Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications ofDukes v. Wal-Mart,
106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34,37 (2011).
50. Joseph A. Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2014).
51. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 445 (2013).
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52Arbitration. The rise of arbitration predates the Roberts Court, but the
Roberts Court has been particularly aggressive in promoting it53 : allocating more
issues to arbitrators and fewer to courts;54 preempting state laws that create
obstacles to arbitration; and limiting exceptions designed to ensure the
effective vindication of substantive rights. 56 The Roberts Court's arbitration
decisions have been particularly hostile to aggregate dispute resolution. AT&T v.
Concepcion held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted a state law
that treated certain class action waivers as unconscionable.57 American Express
v. Italian Colors later refused to invalidate an arbitration agreement with a class-
arbitration waiver even if class resolution was the only economically viable way
to "effective[ly] vindicat[e]" a federal right.5 8
Here again, criticism has been sharp. Dissenting from Italian Colors,
Justice Kagan remarked that "[i]n the hands of today's majority, arbitration
threatens to become ... a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of
meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability."5 9 Scholars
have been similarly critical. Judith Resnik observed that the Court's arbitration
jurisprudence "strips individuals of access to courts to enforce state and federal
rights, strips the public of its rights of audience to observe state-empowered
decision makers imposing legally binding decisions, and strips the courts of their
obligation to respond to alleged injuries." 60 Other scholars have explained that
Concepcion and Italian Colors "operate to dismantle entire fields of law,
including laws against fraud, deception, predatory conduct, antitrust violations,
and employment discrimination,"61 and they "erode substantive law from the
52. See, e.g., Resnik, Difusing Disputes, supra note 16.
53. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in
Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795, 852 (2012) ("[T]he
Roberts Court . . . produced more infatuatedly and dramatically divisive pro-arbitration opinions
restricting class action litigation and even class action arbitration.").
54. E.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
55. E.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (rejecting state court contract
interpretation that revived the rule preempted in Concepcion); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333 (2011) (preempting California rule that invalidated as unconscionable certain consumer
contracts of adhesion containing class-arbitration waivers); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008)(preempting administrative-exhaustion requirement).
56. E.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (refusing to invalidate
arbitration agreement prohibiting class arbitration). Stolt-Nielsen SA. v. AnimalFeeds International
further held that an arbitrator could not unilaterally impose class procedures without affirmative consent
of the parties. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
57. 563 U.S. at 333.
58. 133 S. Ct. at 2317.
59. 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
60. Resnik, Difusing Disputes, supra note 16, at 2811.
61. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 268 (2015).
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books, with the consequent erosion of both the private compensatory goals and
public deterrent objectives of that law." 62
Standing. Although standing doctrine in recent years has "fragmented," 63
with respect to private disputes6 the Roberts Court's main contribution has been
to limit Congress's ability to confer Article III standing on litigants.65 In a
measured opinion, Spokeo v. Robins reaffirmed that "Congress cannot erase
Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a
plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing." 66 In particular, the Court
explained that Congress could not provide standing for a "bare procedural
violation" or a deprivation that is not sufficiently "concrete." 67 Whatever these
phrases mean, the result cannot be that "a plaintiff automatically satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right
and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right." 68
Leading up to Spokeo, one critic asked "whether the conservative wing of
the Roberts Court will respect our Constitution's guarantee of access to courts or
subvert it, leaving Americans without legal recourse when corporations violate
federal rights." 69 Reveling in its less-devastating-than-expected outcome,
another wrote that Spokeo "was supposed to be one of those cases that lets the
Supreme Court's conservatives gut class action rules without most people
noticing." 70 And still, critics have worried that Spokeo's contribution to standing
62. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion ofSubstantive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052, 3054 (2015).
63. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation ofStanding, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061
(2015) (arguing standing doctrine has become inconsistent and anomalous based on recent precedent).
64. By private disputes, I mean to exclude suits by or against government actors, such as
decisions on national security, the First Amendment, and equal protection. See id. at 1071-89 (collecting
cases).
65. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) ("[T]he requirement of
injury in fact is a hard floor of Article I jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute."). As explained
below, although this message addresses Congress, it is best viewed as a limit on federal courts. See infra
notes 219-227 and accompanying text see also Zachary D. Clopton, Justiciability, Federalism, and the
Administrative State, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (elaborating on this interpretation and
its consequences for policymaking).
66. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 820 n.3 (1997)); see also id. at 1548 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 100 (1979)) ("In no event ... may Congress abrogate the Art. Ei minima . . .
67. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
68. Id. The Court seems more willing to find Congress-created standing when a state is bringing
suit. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Fallon, supra note 63.
69. David Gans, No Day in Court: Big Business's Attack on Access to Courts, BALKINIZATION
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/10/no-day-in-court-big-businesss-attack-on.htnl
[https://perma.cc/X2DB-GB2G].
70. Mark Joseph Stem, SCOTUS Misses an Opportunity to Gut Class Actions and Consumer
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law "seems to be serving no purpose other than to constitutionalize a
deregulatory agenda." 71
More generally, critics have argued that the Supreme Court's standing
doctrine represents "an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative
power,"72 and that it "mak[es] it more difficult to implement federal laws." 73
Standing doctrine is a particular barrier to private enforcement,74 as critics have
argued that its current incarnation "effectively preclude[s] Congress from
pushing private enforcement of public law to its outermost limits."7 5 For its part,
the Roberts Court seems to treat these criticisms as consistent with its goals.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy remarked that "[i]n an era of frequent
litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective effect, and
continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more careful
to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so."76
Personal Jurisdiction. The Roberts Court also has taken up constitutional
limits on personal jurisdiction. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown77 and
Daimler v. Bauman, the Court reined in some lower court decisions that
stretched "general jurisdiction" to non-home-state corporations.79 The Court also
held tight to limits on "specific jurisdiction." In J McIntyre v. Nicastro, a divided
Court held that New Jersey could not assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer of a machine that harmed a New Jersey resident.80 And most
recently in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, the Court rejected California
jurisdiction over claims by noncitizens against an out-of-state drug company,
and in so doing, seemingly altered the theoretical basis of specific jurisdiction-
if not more.8 1
71. Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 440 (2017).
72. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed
Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170-71 (1993).
73. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 303
(2005).
74. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014).
75. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship
Between Public and Private Enforcement ofRule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1316 (2008).
76. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011).
77. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
78. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
79. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 926-29 (defining the limited scope of general jurisdiction);
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756-58 (same). See generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966) (delineating general
versus specific jurisdiction).
80. 564 U.S. 873 (2011); see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (articulating further
limits on specific jurisdiction).
81. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (emphasizing the "sovereignty" rationale for personal jurisdiction).
See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants' Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb




Commenters have noted that the aforementioned general-jurisdiction
decisions reflect the Court's "restrictive ethos."82 Similarly, they claim that the
specific-jurisdiction decisions "[l]imit [c]onsumers' [a]ccess to [j]udicial
[r]emedies"83 and represent "yet another procedural stop sign, one posted at the
very genesis of the case."84 More generally, critics of personal jurisdiction law
have worried that these cases "provide[] a blueprint" for foreign corporations to
avoid US courts.85
International Law Cases. Although some of the aforementioned decisions
have consequences for international litigation,8 I want to address separately
those decisions that focus on international law claims.8 7 First, in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) 89 to cases that "touch and concern the territory of the United States."90
Second, in a series of decisions regarding the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations,91 the Supreme Court held-contrary to the International Court of
Justice 92-that Vienna Convention claims raised in habeas proceedings are
subject to state procedural default rules.93
These cases too were criticized for keeping deserving plaintiffs out of
court.94 Scholars have noted that "Kiobel presents a barrier to those seeking
access to judicial remedies for businesses' involvement in human rights abuses
outside the United States,"95  and now "parties with claims implicating
82. Donald Earl Childress m, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New
World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 999 (2015).
83. Greg Saetrum, Righting the Ship: Implications of J. McIntyre v. Nicastro and How to
Navigate the Stream of Commerce in its Wake, 55 AluZ. L. REV. 499, 522 (2013).
84. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation ofFederal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 352 (2013).
85. Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Court's New Personal
Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 212 (2015).
86. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
87. The Roberts Court has also evinced hostility towards international claims based on US law.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (applying a restrictive presumption
against extraterritoriality to federal statutes). See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing recent decisions on
extraterritoriality and arguing against the current approach).
88. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
90. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125.
91. Garcia v. Texas, 564 U.S. 940 (2011) (discussing the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261); Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759 (2008)
(same); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (same); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331
(2006) (same); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam) (same).
92. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Mar. 31) (holding that the United States breached its obligations under the Convention).
93. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76; Medellin, 552 U.S. at 517.
94. In other words, "U.S. courts have pursued a studied avoidance of transnational litigation."
Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2015).
95. Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations
of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 198 (2014).
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international law will have more difficulty gaining access to domestic United
States courts to litigate." 96
Summary. Returning to Dean Chemerinsky's observation, it appears to
many commentators that the Roberts Court is "systematically closing the
courthouse doors." 97 This claim applies to each of the topics addressed here:
pleading; summary judgment; class actions; arbitration; standing; personal
jurisdiction; and international law. In most of these areas, this claim is probably
accurate. Scholars have correctly identified ways that these procedural doctrines
impede court access and private enforcement-at least within the federal
courts. When we account for state courts and public suits, however, the story
becomes more complex.
II.
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN STATE COURTS
In a 1977 article for the Harvard Law Review, Justice William Brennan
argued that state courts should use state constitutions to protect individual rights
where the Burger Court had cut them back.99 Though the record was mixed, some
state courts took Justice Brennan up on this suggestion.100
Although I do not endorse this strategy with the vigor of Justice Brennan,
this Section observes that state courts similarly have the authority to use state
law to deviate from the Roberts Court's approach to civil procedure.' 01 This
Section teases out these doctrinal pathways and examines the extent to which
state courts have taken advantage of such opportunities to date. Regardless of
whether these opportunities are welcome, this Section shows that dismayed
advocates of private enforcement and court access may find receptive audiences
if they look outside of the federal courts.
96. Laura E. Little, Empowerment Through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or Hybrid
Lawmaking?, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 955, 967 (2009).
97. Chemerinsky, supra note 3.
98. Cf infra Parts 11-II (observing alternatives to federal procedure).
99. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
IARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival ofState Constitutions as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986). For a
discussion of state courts and federal statutory interpretation, see generally Amanda Frost, Inferiority
Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal
Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015).
100. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761 (1992) (collecting sources and criticizing the project).
101. State procedural deviation from the Supreme Court is not limited to the Roberts Court. See,
e.g., 8 ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2022 (3d
ed. 2017 Update) (discussing state deviation from Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), on attorney
work product); Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure (in progress) (on file with author).
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A. Federal Rules in State Courts
One major category of Supreme Court decisions arises out of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang have argued that
the Supreme Court is the primary locus for ideological retrenchment against
private enforcement of federal claims.102 Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin
Clermont found "plaintiphobia" in Supreme Court decisional law.io3 These
authors, and many others, have emphasized the pernicious consequences of the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Federal Rules. 104
This Section begins with an unexceptional claim: the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are federal rules of civil procedure. os They do not apply directly in
state courts,106 and they cannot under current law.107 States thus remain free to
reject Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal procedural rules, even if state
rules are patterned on the federal ones.108 This Section explores whether states
have deviated from federal rules with respect to pleading, summary judgment,
and class actions.
1. Pleading
Given their salience, I begin with Twombly and Iqbal. Although many
investigations into pleading regimes divide the world into "fact pleading" and
102. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 19, at 3. Burbank and Farhang emphasized that this
effect is driven by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, rather than its rulemaking. Id
103. Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 5.
104. See supra notes 28-33, 35, 38, 46-51 (citing sources). This is not to suggest that these
authors find the Federal Rules to be the exclusive source of such retrenchment. See, e.g., BURBANK &
FARHANG, supra note 19, at 144-45 (referring to decisions about standing, private rights of action,
attorney's fees, damages, and arbitration).
105. FED. R CIv. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts . . . .").
106. Even in so-called "Reverse Erie" cases, state courts applying federal procedural doctrines
to federally created rights are not applying the Federal Rules of their own force. See, e.g., STEVEN H.
STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 12.7 (2016) (collecting examples of states
mirroring and not mirroring federal pleading standards for Section 1983 claims in state courts).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (Rules Enabling Act).
108. There is considerable difficulty in measuring the degree of overlap between federal and state
systems of procedure. The prevailing view seems to be that the Federal Rules had a marked impact on
the form of state procedure (rules versus code), and that they initially had a strong impact on content,
though that trend has slowed, if not reversed. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and
the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Unformity in Three States That Have Not
Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001); John B. Oakley, A Fresh
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon,
The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1367 (1986). This paper contributes to this inquiry by examining not the role of the Federal Rules
per se, but the role of the Supreme Court's changing interpretation of those rules. Cf Stephen N. Subrin
& Thomas 0. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501 (2016) (discussing whether state rule-
makers should track federal rule amendments).
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"notice pleading" jurisdictions,1 09 the effect of Twombly and Iqbal is more
nuanced. Under the new regime, in order to defeat a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff must establish the "plausibility" of an entitlement to relief in federal
court. 110
Because plausibility pleading is (supposedly) grounded in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has not required it for state courts. And
although some states have voluntarily adopted this standard,111 courts in nineteen
states have expressly rejected plausibility pleading: Alabama;1 12 Arizona;113
Delaware;114 Georgia;i1s Iowa;116 Kansas;"l7 Minnesota; Montana;119
Nevada;120 New Mexico;121 New York;122 North Carolina;123 Ohio;124
109. See Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintifs File? A
Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 827 (2013) (classifying jurisdictions
and collecting additional sources).
110. See supra notes 22-25, 27 and accompanying text; see also Clermont, supra note 27, at
1348-50 (suggesting "fact pleading" as a preferable alternative to "plausibility pleading").
111. See Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588, 595 (Colo. 2016) (en banc); Edelman v. Laux, No.
CV 115005710, 2013 WL 4504793, at *20 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 26, 2013) (collecting cases); Potomac
Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C. Ct. App. 2011); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor
Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264,
278 (Neb. 2010), overruledon other grounds by Davis v. State, 902 N.W.2d 165 (2017); Sisney v. Best
Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 809 (S.D. 2008); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2014); Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 849 N.W.2d 693, 699-701 (Wis. 2014); see
also MYD Marine Distrib., Inc. v. Int'l Paint Ltd., 76 So. 3d 42, 47 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(potentially limited to antitrust law). Maine uses Twombly for civil perjury claims. Bean v. Cummings,
939 A.2d 676, 680 (Me. 2008). And there is a split among courts in Ohio and Texas. See infra notes
124, 127. For further discussion of some of these decisions, see generally Scott Dodson, The
Gravitational Force ofFederal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 703 (2016).
112. Thomas v. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1234, 1236 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
113. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 345 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc).
114. Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del.
2011).
115. Bush v. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, 720 S.E.2d 370, 375 n.13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
116. Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608-09
(Iowa 2012).
117. Smith v. State, No. 104,775, 2012 WL 1072756, at *6 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2012).
118. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014).
119. Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 494, 500 (Mont. 2012).
120. Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 293 P.3d 869, 871 n.2 (Nev. 2013).
121. Madrid v. Vill. of Chama, 283 P.3d 871, 876 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
122. Krause v. Lancer & Loader Grp. LLC, 965 N.Y.S.2d 312, 320 n.3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
123. Holleman v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579, 584-85 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
124. There is a split in authority among Ohio's courts of appeals. See Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of
Ohio, 6 N.E.3d 106, 113-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2014) (rejecting plausibility); Bahen v. Diocese
of Steubenville, No. 11 JE 34, 2013 WL 2316640, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. May 24, 2013) (same);
Sacksteder v. Senney, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695, at *9--11 (Ohio Ct App. 2d Dist. Dec. 28, 2012)
(same). But see Mohat v. Horvath, No. 2013-L-009, 2013 WL 5450296, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist.
Sept. 30, 2013) (accepting plausibility); Bumpus v. Ward, No. 2012-CA-5, 2012 WL 4789768, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Oct. 9, 2012) (same).
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Oklahoma;125 Tennessee;126 Texas;127 Vermont; 128 Washington;129 and West
Virginia.130 For good measure, the local courts of Guaml31 and the Northern
Mariana Islandsl32 have rejected plausibility pleading too.133 Suits in these courts
may survive a motion to dismiss even if they would not pass muster in federal
court. For example, according to the Washington Supreme Court: "The Supreme
Court's plausibility standard is predicated on policy determinations specific to
the federal trial courts.... Neither party has shown these policy determinations
hold sufficiently true in the Washington trial courts to warrant such a drastic
change in court procedure."' 34 Indeed, multiple state courts have applied liberal
state pleading standards to federal claims (such as Section 1983 claims) rather
than testing them for plausibility.' 35
125. Edelen v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 266 P.3d 660, 663 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
126. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422,425 (Tenn. 2011).
127. There is a split among Texas courts of appeals. See Reaves v. Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d
594, 612 (Tex. Ct. App. Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017) (rejecting plausibility). But see GoDaddy.com,
LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. Beaumont 2014) (accepting plausibility). After
Twombly and Iqbal, the Texas Supreme Court characterized Texas as a "notice pleading" jurisdiction.
See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015).
128. Colby v. Umbrella, 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008).
129. McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
130. Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 189 n.4 (W. Va. 2010).
131. Ukau v. Wang, No. CVA15-008, 2016 WL 4582244, at *4 (Guam Aug. 31, 2016).
132. Syed v. Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, No. 090467, 2012 WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec.
31, 2012).
133. In addition to the cases cited in the prior notes, two Indiana cases have declined to apply
Twombly and Iqbal. State v. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 n. 1 (Ind. 2008); Droscha v.
Shepherd, 931 N.E.2d 882, 887 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). And two Missouri cases have implied a
distinction between state pleading requirements and plausibility. Crest Constr. II, Inc. v. Hart, 487
S.W.3d 85, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Jennings v. Bd. of Curators of Mo. State Univ., 386 S.W.3d 796,
799 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
134. McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
135. See, e.g., Davis v. Bay Cty. Jail, 155 So. 3d 1173, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (applying
state pleading standard to Section 1983 claim); Landrith v. Jordan, No. 107,959, 2013 WL 5187269, at
* 10 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2013) (applying state pleading standard to Section 1983 claim); Thompson
v. City of New York, 23 N.Y.S.3d 839, 856-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (collecting New York cases
applying state pleading standards to Section 1983 claims); Torres v. McCann, No. 13-15-00187-CV,
2016 WL 3225880, at *5 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. June 30,2016) (applying state pleading standard to Section
1983 claim); Peak Alarm Co., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 243 P.3d 1221, 1245 & n.13 (Utah 2010)
(applying state "notice pleading" standard to Section 1983 case after Twombly). Although courts in
Delaware and California have applied federal pleading standards to Section 1983 cases, those states
typically apply fact pleading. See, e.g., Golin v. Allenby, A140652, 2015 WL 5513224, at * 4 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1st Dist. Sept. 18, 2015) (applying federal pleading standard to Section 1983 suit); Eskridge v.
Hutchins, No. K16C-10-009 JJC, 2017 WL 1076726, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2017) (same). In
other words, in Delaware and California, state pleading standards might be more restrictive, and the
Supreme Court has been wary about states unduly restricting pleading in certain federal claims. See
Brown v. W. Ry. Co. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (holding that state could not apply restrictive state
pleading standards to FELA claim).
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Table A-State Pleading Standards1 36
Notice Fact Plausibility
Alabama* New Jersey Arkansas Colorado
Alaska New Mexico* California Dist. of Columbia
Arizona* New York* Connecticut Massachusetts
Georgia* North Carolina* Delaware* 137  Nebraska
Hawai'i North Dakota Florida South Dakota
Idaho Ohio* Illinois Wisconsin
Indiana Oklahoma* Louisiana










*State court rejected plausibility
2. Summary Judgment
The effects of Scott v. Harris's approach to summary judgment in state
courts are more difficult to discern. As explained above, Scott seemed to erase
the typical summary judgment deference if plaintiffs position "blatantly
contradicts" the record. Since Scott, many state courts addressing state law
claims139 have interpreted their summary judgment rules to include a new
136. See infra Appendix 1 citing each state's standard and any responses to Twombly and Iqbal.
137. Delaware is challenging to classify. See Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354,
360 (Del. 2013) (demanding pleading of facts); Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808, 813 n.12
(Del. 2013) (applying a "conceivability" standard); Tekstrom, Inc. v. Savla, No. 464, 2006, 2007 WL
328836, at *5 (Del. 2007) (characterizing Delaware as a notice-pleading state); Fennell v. Hampton, No.
249, 2010, 2010 WL 4103011, at *2 (Del. 2010) (applying the "no set of facts" standard). Most studies
treat Delaware as a fact-pleading state. See Curry & Ward, supra note 109; Oakley, supra note 108;
Oakley & Coon, supra note 108.
138. See 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); see also supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text; Wolff,
supra note 38, at 1353 (collecting federal cases and explaining that "developments in the lower federal
courts reveal that the uncertainty introduced by the opinion is already eroding this core feature of the
summary judgment standard").
139. For purposes of this study, I exclude federal claims in state court that might receive federal
treatment based on preemption or "Reverse Erie." See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (requiring
the state court to apply federal procedure to Section 1983 suit); see also Slowikowska v. San Diego
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category of "blatantly contradicting" versions of events.140 In other words, many
state courts have followed Scott as persuasive authority. Though there are some
cases in which state courts have found Scott inapposite,141 I was unable to locate
any state court decisions expressly rejecting Scott's "blatantly contradicts"
approach.142 I cannot rule out state courts implicitly rejecting Scott,14 but it is
noteworthy that while many state courts have cited it approvingly, none has
announced to litigants and future courts that it should not apply.144
Sheriff's Dep't, D066597, 2015 WL 7307867, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015) (citing Scott for the
"blatantly contradicts" test in a Section 1983 case in state court but not specifying whether it was
applying federal or state procedure).
140. For cases articulating a "blatantly contradicts" test in state court on state law claims, see
Carter v. City ofNew London Bd. ofEduc., No. KNLCV146022709S, 2015 WL 7268504, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015); Council of Unit Owners of Windswept Condo. Ass'n v. Schumm, No. S12C-
08-011 RFS, 2013 WL 6133621, at *6 n.46 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2013); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores
E., LP, 765 S.E.2d 518, 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014); Porter v. Massarelli, 692 S.E.2d 722, 725 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010); Calhoun v. CSX Transp., Inc., 331 S.W.3d 236, 245 (Ky. 2011); Dyer v. Dep't of Transp.,
951 A.2d 821, 827 n.6 (Me. 2008); Fuhr v. Trinity Health Corp., 837 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. 2013)
(reversing and adopting the dissent from Fuhr v. Trinity Health Corp., No. 309877, 2013 WL 1629301,
at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2013)); Williams v. Nat'1 Interstate Ins. Co., No. 323343, 2016 WL
416496, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016); Rivera v. City Of Battle Creek, No. 310951, 2013 WL
2495083, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2013); Niva v. McCardell, No. 296847,2011 WL 1519363, at
*4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2011); Duckworth v. Warren, 10 So. 3d 433, 438 (Miss. 2009); Fasch v.
M.K. Weeden Const., Inc., 262 P.3d 1117, 1122 (Mont. 2011); Alfano v. Schaud, 60 A.3d 501, 505
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 2014 WL 5487564, at *9 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 31, 2014), rev'd, 142 A.3d 742 (N.J. 2016); Paez v. Burlington N. Santa Fe
Ry., 362 P.3d 116, 123 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Perez v. City of Albuquerque, 276 P.3d 973, 975 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2012); Rasmussen v. Hancock Cty. Comm'rs, No. 5-06-54, 2008 WL 2168874, at *7 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 27, 2008); Sellers v. Twp. of Abington, 106 A.3d 679, 690 (Pa. 2014); Eisele v. Bond,
No. 61663-3-1, 2009 WL 2008397, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). Other formulations are possible as
well. See, e.g., Martin v. Hallum, 374 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Scott for the
proposition that "we are not obliged to ignore incontrovertible evidence"); Lubar v. Connelly, 86 A.3d
642, 652 (Me. 2014) (citing Scott for "utterly discredited" standard). No state court summary judgment
decision invoked the "blatantly contradicts" language prior to Scott.
141. See, e.g., Duckworth, 10 So. 3d at 438 (citing Scott approvingly but finding it not
dispositive).
142. In one case, a Delaware court expressly reserved the question whether Scott changed the
state's summary judgment standard. See Turner v. Ass'n of Owners of Bethany Seaview Condo., No.
S11 C-12-010 RFS, 2013 WL 1861930, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2013). Two subsequent decisions
by the same court treated Turner as if it adopted Scott. See Gary v. R.C. Fabricators, Inc., No. 11 C-12-
208 FSS, 2014 WL 4181479, at *18 (Del. Super. Ct. July 30, 2014); Council of Unit Owners of
Windswept Condo. Ass'n v. Schumm, No. S12C-08-011 RFS, 2013 WL 6133621, at *6 (Del. Super.
Ct. Nov. 20, 2013).
143. A conscious but implicit rejection of a precedent is hard to identify. In Fuhr v. Trinity Health
Corp., the dissenting opinion relied on Scott while the majority did not. No. 309877, 2013 WL 1629301
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2013). Months later, the Michigan Supreme Court issued a one-sentence order
reversing the Court of Appeals "for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion." See
Fuhr v. Trinity Health Corp., 837 N.W.2d 275 (mem.) (2013). In other words, Michigan now follows
Scott.
144. One additional difficulty in ascertaining the effects of Scott is that the Court in Scott was not
explicit about how its opinion modified the deference afforded to plaintiffs in summary judgment.
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Some state courts, however, rejected the Supreme Court's earlier changes
to summary judgment from the Celotex decision.145 There has not been a
comprehensive study of state summary judgment practice in the wake of
Celotex,146 but my research reveals that fourteen states reject Celotex in whole
or in part:147 Connecticut;148 Florida; 149 Georgia;'" Indiana;" Kentucky;15
145. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Taken
together, these decisions comprise the "summary judgment trilogy" or the "Celotex trilogy".
146. As with Twombly and Iqbal, there has been a vigorous debate about the effects of Celotex
and its progeny. See, e.g., JOE S. CECIL & C.R. DOUGLAS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PRACTICE IN THREE DISTRICT COURTS (1987); Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 5; Issacharoff &
Loewenstein, supra note 35; Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of
the Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (2014); Miller, supra note 35; Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th
Anniversary ofthe Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado About Very Little, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561
(2012); Redish, supra note 35; Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA.
L. REv. 139 (2007).
147. The degree to which these courts "reject" Celotex varies, in part depending on the existing
summary judgment standard of the state before Celotex.
148. See Adams v. Laval, No. CV126026706S, 2014 WL 7271874, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
12, 2014) ("[R]eliance [on Celotex] is misplaced .... [A] party moving for summary judgment under
Connecticut's rules of practice bears a heavier burden than it would under the federal rules."); Tangari
v. Am. Optical Corp., No. CV065003634S, 2013 WL 6171421, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2013)
(party moving for summary judgment has higher burden in Connecticut practice); Thomas v. A.O. Smith
Corp., No. CV105029385S, 2012 WL 695550, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2012) ("The defendant
relies on the United States Supreme Court case of Celotex .... If this court were bound by Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court would view defendant's argument more favorably.");
Waste Conversion Techs., Inc. v. Midstate Recovery, LLC, No. AANCV044000948, 2008 WL
5481231, at *26 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2008) ("Celotex is not the law of Connecticut.").
149. See Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., 948 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2007)
(Celotex and progeny are "of limited precedential value in Florida summary judgment cases"); Lich v.
N.C.J. Inv. Co., 728 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1999) (higher burden on party
moving for summary judgment in Florida); Green v. CSX Transp., Inc., 626 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1993) (per curiam) ("Under Florida law ... the party moving for summary judgment
is required to conclusively demonstrate the nonexistence of an issue of material fact. . . ."); 5G's Car
Sales, Inc. v. Fla. Dept'. of Law Enf't, 581 So. 2d 212, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist 1991) ("Celotex
and similar cases do not represent the law of Florida on the issue.").
150. See First Union Nat'l. Bank of Ga. v. J. Reisbaum Co., 378 S.E.2d 317, 319 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (denying motion for rehearing based on Celotex, concluding that Georgia precedent controls);
Hepner v. S. Ry. Co., 356 S.E.2d 30, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
151. See Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994)
("Indiana does not adhere to Celotex and the federal methodology."); Dennis v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
831 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting a "distinct difference" between Indiana and federal
summary judgment rules).
152. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 481-82 (Ky. 1991)




Missouri;153 New Mexico; 154 New York; North Carolina; 15 6 Oklahoma;
Oregon;1s Texas;159 Utah; 1o and Virginia. Another four states-Alabama,162
153. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380
(Mo. 1993) (en banc) (highlighting different roles of summary judgment in Missouri and federal practice
in light of Missouri's fact-pleading requirements); see also Powel v. Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc.,
197 S.W.3d 576, 591 n.7 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (Wolff, C.J., concurring) ("Federal courts have often
been overly aggressive in granting summary judgment under the Celotex trilogy of United States
Supreme Court decisions. This, fortunately, has not been the case in Missouri courts although the
standard stated is basically the same.").
154. See Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 242 P.3d 280,287-88 (N.M. 2010) ("New Mexico courts,
unlike federal courts, view summary judgment with disfavor, preferring a trial on the merits .... We
continue to refuse to loosen the reins of summary judgment . . . .").
155. See Yun Tung Chow v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 950 N.E.2d 113,118 (N.Y. 2011) (Smith,
J., concurring) (cautioning litigants about the difference between New York and federal approaches to
summary judgment).
156. See Metts v. Piver, 401 S.E.2d 407,409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) ("North Carolina is not bound
by Celotex."). But see Scarborough v. Dillard's, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 640, 644 (N.C. 2011) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
157. See Iglehart v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 60 P.3d 497, 501 & n.9 (Okla. 2002) ("Oklahoma's
summary adjudication process is similar, but not identical, to that followed in the federal judicial
system."); Kating v. City of Pryor ex rel. Mun. Util. Bd., 977 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998)
("[F]ederal summary judgment standards established in Celoter ... and other related federal cases are
not specifically applicable in Oklahoma appellate review of summary judgments.").
158. See Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 P.2d 608, 615-16 (Or. 1997) (observing that Oregon
did not adopt the Celotex trilogy).
159. See Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989) ("Nothing in either decision [in
Liberty Lobby or Celotex] compels us to abandon our established summary judgment procedure either
generally or in the particular facts of this case."), superseded in part by, Tex. R. Civ. P. 1 16a(i) as
amended; see also Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 19 S.W.3d 413, 420-22 (Tex. 2000)
(criticizing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242).
160. See Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 603-04 (Utah 2008) ("While [Celotex] has been the
law in the federal courts for over two decades now, it is not Utah law."); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d
433, 445 n.13 (Utah 1996) ("This court has not previously adopted the reasoning of the majority opinion
in Celotex, which is not binding on us as a matter of law, and declines to do so today."); see also Jones
& Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 284 P.3d 630,639 n.9 (Utah 2012) ("While we have not adopted Celotex
in its entirety, there are significant portions of our jurisprudence that are entirely consistent with
Celotex.").
161. See Realstar Realtors, LLCv. Glenn ex rel. Smith, No. CL99-186, 2001 WL 587489, at *5
(Va. Cir. Ct. May 23, 2001) (noting difference between Virginia and federal approaches to summary
judgment but concluding the Virginia Supreme Court would be likely to apply the logic of Celotex in
this case); Bhalala & Shah, Inc. v. Quick Out MkL, Inc., No. 131309, 1994 WL 1031171, at *2 n.4 (Va.
Cir. Ct. May 2, 1994) (explaining that under Virginia law, a denial in a pleading is sufficient to bar
summary judgment); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Capital GMC Trucks, Inc., No. LT-2254-2, 1993 WL
945924, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 22, 1993) (concluding that the Virginia Supreme Court has suggested a
higher evidentiary burden for a party moving for summary judgment than under federal law).
162. See Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 688 (Ala. 1989), overruled by, Ex parte Gen.
Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999).
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California,163 Louisiana,164 and Tennessee -rejected Celotex at one time but
have since adopted Celotex by statute or by judicial decision. 166 Alaska,167
Idaho,s New Jersey,'69 and Wyomingo apply Celotex, but they rejected its
summary judgment cousin Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.17 1 Thus, state courts have
demonstrated a willingness to reject the Supreme Court's modern summary
judgment decisions, though not (or not yet) Scott v. Harris.
163. See Aguilar v. AtI. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 509 (Cal. 2001) ("[S]ummary judgment law
in this state now conforms, largely but not completely, to its federal counterpart as clarified and
liberalized in Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita."); Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, 107 Cal. Rptr.
2d 209, 213-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (chronicling dispute among California courts).
164. See Sassone v. Elder, 626 So. 2d 345, 351 (La. 1993) (noting difference between state and
federal summary judgment practice; superseded by amendments to La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (1996));
see also Samaha v. Rau, 977 So. 2d 880, 883 (La. 2008) (noting that 1997 amendments to La. Code Civ.
Proc. Ann. art. 966 (1996) mirrored the standard in Celotex).
165. See Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Tenn. 2008) (explaining that
Tennessee adopted Justice Brennan's dissent in Celotex), overruled by Rye v. Women's Care Ctr., 477
S.W.3d 235, 261-63 (Tenn. 2015).
166. See supra notes 162-165.
167. See Greywolfv. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007) (applying Celotex); Moffatt v.
Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1988) (criticizing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986)).
168. See Chandler v. Hayden, 215 P.3d 485 (Idaho 2009) (applying Celotex); G&M Farms v.
Funk Irrigation Co., 808 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Idaho 1991) (declining to apply Liberty Lobby's approach
outside of defamation cases); see also 1OB CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvL § 2730 (4th ed. 2017 Update) (discussing the federal practice of
applying Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) outside of defamation cases).
169. See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146, 155-56 (N.J. 1995) (adopting
standards from Celotex); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ'g Co., 516 A.2d 220, 235-36 (N.J. 1986)
(criticizing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
170. See Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588, 593 (Wyo. 1999) (applying Celotex); Parker v. Haller,
751 P.2d 372, 376-77 (Wyo. 1988) (declining to adopt the standards from Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242
(1986)).
171. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Celotex and Liberty Lobby address different aspects of the summary
judgment standard, so it would not be incoherent to adopt one and not the other.
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Table B-State Decisions on Celotex 7 2
Rejecting Celotex Applying Celotex
Connecticut Alabama* Kansas North Carolina*
Florida Alaska Louisiana* North Dakota
Georgia Arizona Maine Ohio
Indiana Arkansas Maryland Pennsylvania
Kentucky California* Massachusetts Rhode Island
Missouri Colorado Michigan South Carolina
New Mexico Dist. of Minnesota South Dakota
New York Columbia Mississippi Tennessee*
Oklahoma Delaware Montana Vermont
Oregon Hawai'i Nebraska Washington
Texas Idaho Nevada West Virginia
Utah Illinois New Hampshire Wisconsin
Virginia Iowa New Jersey* Wyoming
*Previously rejected Celotex
3. Class Actions
Turning to class actions, Wal-Mart v. Dukes seemed to increase the
evidentiary burden of establishing commonality among class members.1 73 Prior
to this Article, there has been little scholarly attention on how states have reacted
to Dukes.1 74
172. Case citations are available in Appendix 2.
173. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
174. As the foregoing demonstrates, there has been comparatively less attention to Dukes in the
states. In part it may be because the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) sweeps into federal court many
of the cases for which Dukes has the most bite. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
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On the one hand, the highest state courts in Arkansas,175 Georgia,176
Louisiana,' Montana, Ohio,179 and Oklahoma, 80 as well as lower courts in
(at least)1 8 1 Delaware,182 Kansas,183 Kentucky, 184 Missouri,185 Texas,186 and
Washington, 187 have endorsed the Dukes position on commonality.
On the other hand, a few state courts have rejected Dukes. 8 8 In Soper v.
Tire Kingdom,189 the Florida Supreme Court summarily reversed a lower court
decision applying Dukes 90 over a dissent trumpeting Dukes.19' Based on
differences between the federal and state rules, New York's highest court
explained in Jiannaras v. Alfant that "Wal-Mart has no bearing" on the
175. See CACH, LLC v. Echols, 506 S.W.3d 217, 222 (Ark. 2016).
176. See Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 762 S.E.2d 419, 421-22 (Ga. 2014);
see also Deal v. Miller, 739 S.E.2d 487,490-91 nn. 11-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Rite Aid of Ga., Inc. v.
Peacock, 726 S.E.2d 577, 579 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
177. See Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960, 969 (La. 2011); see also Doe v. S. Gyms, LLC, 112 So.
3d 822, 829-30 (La. 2013) (following Price); Albe v. City of New Orleans, 174 So. 3d 212, 220-21
(La. Ct. App. 2015); Hill y. Hebert, 169 So. 3d 731, 733 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (same).
178. See Roose v. Lincoln Cty. Emp. Group Health Plan, 362 P.3d 40,46 (Mont. 2015); Sangwin
v. State, 315 P.3d 279,284-85 (Mont. 2013); Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 P.3d 452,460-61 (Mont.
2013); Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 291 P.3d 1209, 1219-20 (Mont. 2012); Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare
Corp., 288 P.3d 193, 206-07 (Mont. 2012). Montana also has endorsed Comcast v. Behrend, 569 U.S.
27 (2013). See Byorth v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 384 P.3d 455,460-61 (Mont. 2016).
179. See Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 49 N.E.3d 1224, 1230 (Ohio 2015); Cullen v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 999 N.E.2d 614, 620-21 (Ohio 2013); Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co.,
994 N.E.2d 408, 415-16 (Ohio 2013).
180. See Marshall Cty. v. Homesales, Inc., 339 P.3d 878, 884 (Okla. 2014).
181. California courts are split. Compare Strong v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. B231512, 2013 WL
241982, at *2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 23, 2013) (accepting Dukes), with Ammari Elecs. v. Pac.
Bell Directory, No. A136801, 2014 WL 989166, at * 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 14,2014) (rejecting
Dukes). See also infra note 194 (discussing Connecticut). A Rhode Island court seemed to apply Dukes,
but this decision is less clear than the others cited herein. See Providence Retired Police v. City of
Providence, No. PC-1 1-5853, 2012 WL 1957737 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 24, 2012).
182. See Carroll v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 163 A.3d 91, 107 & n.77 (Del. Super. Ct. 2017).
183. See Johnson v. MKA Enters., No. 112,049, 2015 WL 4487037, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. July
17, 2015).
184. See Haynes Trucking, LLC v. Hensley, No. 2013-CA-000190-ME, 2016 WL 930271, at *7
(Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).
185. See Lucas Subway MidMo, Inc. v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 524 S.W.3d 116, 129-
30 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
186. See Lon Smith & Assocs., Inc. v. Key, 527 S.W.3d 604, 618-19 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017); Peter
G. Milne, P.C. v. Ryan, 477 S.W.3d 888, 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015); Bliss & Glennon Inc. v. Ashley,
420 S.W.3d 379, 396 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014); Canyon Lake Island Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Sterling/Suggs
Ltd. P'ship, No. 03-14-00208-CV, 2015 WL 3543125, at *2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. June 5,2015).
187. See Admasu v. Port of Seattle, 340 P.3d 873, 878 n. 18 (Wash Ct. App. 2014).
188. In addition, at least two state decisions expressly rejected Comcast v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27(2013). See Williams v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Cardona v.
Maramont Corp., No. 602877-2007, 2014 WL 2558176, at *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 6, 2014) ("[T]he
court finds that Comcast and Dukes are not controlling.").
189. Soper v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 124 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 2013) (per curiam).
190. Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Dishkin, 81 So. 3d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
191. Soper, 124 So. 3d at 804-07 (Canady, J., dissenting). The majority reaffirmed the state class
action precedent laid out in Sosa v. Safeway Premium Finance Co., 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011).
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certification of a class in New York courts.192 In Migis v. Autozone, Inc., the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that it "fail[ed] to see ... how Wal-Mart controls
in this case, which resolves state claims and applies state class-certification
procedures."193 A Connecticut Superior Court judge issued a long opinion
critical of Dukes, rejecting its view of commonality under Connecticut law. 194
California's intermediate appellate courts are split,'9 5 with a recent decision
stating flatly: "the applicable standard in California is not . . . stated in Wal-
Mart."196 Finally, although it did not address the commonality standard in
particular, the Iowa Supreme Court devoted most of its thirty-two-page majority
opinion in Pippen v. State to criticizing Dukes.197
State resistance to Dukes is particularly significant given another recent
Roberts Court decision. In Smith v. Bayer, the Supreme Court explained that
a state court may go forward with a class action under state procedural law199
after a denial of class certification in federal court. 200 Therefore, state court
deviation from Dukes is significant not only for cases first filed in state court,
but also for state class actions filed after certification is denied in federal court.201
B. Standing in State Courts
The previous Section explored how state courts have declined to follow the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules. State courts may also
sidestep the Court's procedural decisions rooted in Article III of the Constitution.
192. 52 N.E.3d 1166, 1169 (N.Y. 2016); see also Cardona, 2014 WL 2558176, at *13 (rejecting
Dukes and citing other New York cases).
193. 387 P.3d 381, 389 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
194. See Dougan v. Sikorsky Airline Corp., No. X03CV126033069, 2016 WL 921779 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2016). The court predicted: "it is unlikely that the Connecticut Supreme Court would
adopt the Wal-Mart standard." Id at *3. An earlier Connecticut opinion from the same court seemingly
endorsed Dukes, though its endorsement was more equivocal than Dougan's rejection. See Sal's Glass
Co., LLC v. Duplicating Methods Co., No. HHDCV106016006S, 2013 WL 1407500, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1013) (looking to Dukes and authority from other states in the absence of Connecticut
precedent).
195. See supra note 181.
196. Ammari Elecs. v. Pac. Bell Directory, No. 2014 WL 989166,2014 WL 989166, at *11 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 14, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. See 854 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2014). The Iowa Supreme Court was most critical of Dukes's
interpretation of Title VII and its view of workplace discrimination, but it also mentioned the potential
persuasive effect of the Dukes dissenters for issues such as commonality: "[W]ith respect to Wal-Mart,
we have had no occasion to consider whether the majority or minority opinion in this 5-4 decision has
the most persuasive power." Id at 18.
198. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011).
199. In Smith, the state class action was filed in West Virginia court. Id. at 303. Although West
Virginia has not endorsed or departed from Dukes, its class action law deviates from the federal approach
in other ways. See id. at 310 (citing In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003)).
200. See id. at 304-05. The Anti-Injunction Act barred the federal court from enjoining the state
suit, and the federal decision was not preclusive. Id at 307-12.
201. As explained below, a separate suit would be necessary because denial of certification is not
a basis for remand if removal had been based on CAFA. See infra note 279.
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Although the US Constitution applies in state courts,202 Article III regulates only
the power of the federal courts-state colirts are thus free to depart from
constitutional constraints on federal justiciability.203 This Section will focus on
standing, though other Article III doctrines may be subject to similar analysis.204
The mechanism for state court deviation from federal standing law is
straightforward: state courts simply decline to incorporate the federal court
understanding of Article III into state constitutional or common law. In fact, state
courts frequently depart from the federal approach to justiciability. 205 To give an
example paralleling earlier analysis, a number of state court decisions have
expressly rejected Lujan's approach to standing as a requirement for state
206justiciability. More generally, Helen Hershkoff exhaustively described state
court deviations from various federal justiciability doctrines.207 For example, she
noted that virtually every state provides for taxpayer standing.20 8 Hershkoff did
not focus on the type of statutorily defined injury at issue in Spokeo and other
cases,209 but it turns out that many states also deviate from this federal approach
by recognizing statutorily created standing.210
202. See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
203. Id This Section focuses on states applying standing doctrine that is broader than Article III.
State courts may be restricted in their ability to limit standing for federal claims proceeding in state court.
Cf Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1947) (requiring state court to exercise jurisdiction over federal
claim).
204. For recent statements of federal court justiciability law, see, for example, MedImmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (ripeness); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S.
1523 (2013) (mootness); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (political questions). For further
elaboration of the relationship to state courts, see Clopton, supra note 65.
205. For an example that got the attention of the Supreme Court, see Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654, 661 (2003) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that California's unfair competition
law allowed a private attorney general to sue Nike in state court for misrepresentations regarding foreign
working conditions even though plaintiff would have been unable to establish Article EI standing).
206. See, e.g., Citizens for Protection of N. Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawai'i, 979 P.2d
1120, 1127 (Haw. 1999); Nefedro v. Montgomery Cty., 996 A.2d 850, 854 n.3 (Md. 2010); Lansing
Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. Of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 693-96 (Mich. 2010); Goldston v. State,
637 S.E.2d 876, 882 (N.C. 2006); Hous. Auth. of Chester v. Pa State. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 730 A.2d
935, 939-41 (Pa. 1999); In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling re SDCL 62-1-1(6), 877 N.W.2d 340, 348
n.15 (S.D. 2016); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Alexander, No. 2012AP2236, 2013 WL 4104472, at *4
n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
207. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1842-75 (2001) (reviewing advisory opinions, public actions,
mootness, political questions, and nonjudicial functions).
208. See id at 1854.
209. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing Spokeo).
210. See, e.g., Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 31, 40-46 (Ala. 2013);
Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1994); Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n, 792 N.W.2d
at 699; Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State, 865 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. 2015); City of Picayune v. S.
Reg'l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 525-28 (Miss. 2005); Hous. Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 939-41;
Youngblood v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2013); Small v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, 747 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Va. 2013).
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Furthermore, state courts have the authority to apply their local standing
211,
requirements to federal claims. In ASARCO v. Kadish, the Supreme Court
explained that state courts may adjudicate federal claims that would not satisfy212
Article III's case-or-controversy requirement if brought in federal court.
Though not exceedingly common, state courts have adjudicated federal claims
for which federal justiciability was in doubt.213 For example, in Keyhea v.
Rushen, California taxpayers brought suit in state court under Section 1983,
alleging third-party harms to prisoners from the use of psychotropic drugs
against their will, even though they would have lacked standing in federal
court.214 In New Jersey Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel, a nonprofit association
pursued a claim under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, even though
it appeared to lack federal standing.215 In Marriage of Gilbert, a Washington
court found standing under state law to enforce requirements of the Federal Child
Support and Establishment of Paternity Act where federal standing seemed
216doubtful. And in Smith v. Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade &
Consumer Protection, the Seventh Circuit ordered remand of a nonjusticiable
federal constitutional claim to the state court.2 17 The court explained:
While some consider it odd that a state court might have the authority
to hear a federal constitutional claim in a setting where a federal court
would not, it is clear that Article III's "case or controversy" limitations
apply only to the federal courts. . . . Wisconsin's doctrines of standing
and ripeness are the business of the Wisconsin courts, and it is not for
us to venture how the case would there be resolved.218
211. Federal statutes are regularly enforced in state courts unless Congress says otherwise.
Indeed, prior to Reconstruction, there was no grant of general federal question jurisdiction, so many
federal law claims were presumptively adjudicated in state courts. See 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (conferring
federal question jurisdiction on the federal circuit courts for suits with an amount in controversy
exceeding five hundred dollars).
212. See 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ("[S]tate courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or
controversy or other federal rules ofjusticiability even when they address issues of federal law, as when
they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this case, a federal statute."). ASARCO also
explained that the Supreme Court could review such a decision "if the judgment of the state court causes
direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review. . . ." Id. at 623-24.
213. ASARCO itself, and related cases, raised claims pursuant to the federal Arizona-New
Mexico Enabling Act. See, e.g., ASARCO, 490 U.S. 605; Mayer Unified Sch. Dist. v. Winkleman, 207
P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Jeffries v. Hassell, 3 P.3d 1071 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
214. See 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (depublished). Ultimately, plaintiffs did
not prevail on their federal law claim, but they obtained attorney fees under Section 1988 based on a
successful state law claim. Id.
215. See 686 A.2d 1265, 1271-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also Monahan Office
Complex, LTD v. Borough of Dunmore, No. 1205 C.D.2014, 2015 WL 5444903, at *3-6 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2015) (hypothesizing a possible suit under Pennsylvania standing law but finding no state law
standing on these facts).
216. See 945 P.2d 238, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
217. See 23 F.3d 1134, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994).
218. Id (citations omitted); see also Me. Ass'n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Me. Dep't
of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the district court should remand,
rather than dismiss, a case raising a substantial federal issue in which plaintiff lacked Article m
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State court decisions deviating from Article III highlight a tension in the
Supreme Court's justiciability jurisprudence. On the one hand, many cases
holding that Congress may not confer constitutional standing frame the doctrine
as manifesting a separation-of-powers constraint on federal courts. This is the
view articulated in Spokeo and the three earlier cases it cited for that
proposition,219 which is consistent with the more general view of the case-or-
controversy requirement as a constraint on the judicial branch.220 In this light,
decisions on the federal allocation of authority are simply unrelated to the
separation of powers in the states, particularly given the background assumption
of limited federal and general state courts.221
On the other hand, the Lujan decision suggested that, in the context of
private enforcement, standing doctrine stops Congress from encroaching on the
222executive's duty to take care that the laws are enforced. Admittedly, the Court
(and Lujan-author Justice Scalia) seemed to step back from this view of standing
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,223 but it is a defensible view of
the doctrine and one that persuaded some justices over time.224 This view of
standing); Salorio v. Glaser, 414 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1980) (seemingly entertaining federal constitutional
claim where federal standing is questionable); Urban League v. Mahwah Twp., 370 A.2d 521 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1977) (same).
219. See 136 S. Ct. at 1548. Spokeo cited a footnote from Raines v. Byrd, which is appended to
the phrase: "In the light of this overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary's power
within its proper constitutional sphere .... " 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997). The two other cases cited by
Spokeo are equally clear that Article I is about constraining the courts. See Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488,492-93 (2009); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
220. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) ("The law of Article
M standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches."); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947) ("Judicial adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers preserves the
courts for the decision of issues, between litigants, capable of effective determination.").
221. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1 (4th ed. 2003); Nw.
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) ("[F]ederal courts, unlike their state
counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction. . . .").
222. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (citation omitted) ("If the concrete
injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the answer must be
obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers'
compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to
transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."').
223. See 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ("Our
opinion is not motivated ... by the more specific separation-of-powers concern that this citizen's suit
somehow interferes with the Executive's power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' The
courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action, whether or not exceeding that
sphere will harm one of the other two branches. This case calls for nothing more than a straightforward
application of our standing jurisprudence, which, though it may sometimes have an impact on
Presidential powers, derives from Article III and not Article H.").
224. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, JJ.); Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1552-53 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[B]y limiting Congress'
ability to delegate law enforcement authority to private plaintiffs and the courts, standing doctrine
preserves executive discretion."); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J.
221, 233 (1988) ("Where standing to enforce statutorily established duties is at issue, an 'injury in fact'
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standing law cuts against state courts hearing "no-standing" federal claims. It
would be odd to protect executive authority by denying Congress the ability to
create private actions in federal court but allow Congress to create private actions
in state courts instead. And yet, broader state justiciability rules invite exactly
this sort of lawmaking. 225 Indeed, Congress seemingly could create insulated
causes of action for which state court jurisdiction is exclusive226 or removal is
227
prohibited.
In any event, under current law, state courts may entertain state and federal
suits even if plaintiffs would lack Article III standing in federal court.
C. International Law in State Courts
International law cases represent another area in which the Supreme
Court's procedural decisions have attracted criticism,228 and they represent
another area where state courts may provide remedies in spite of procedural
retrenchment in the federal courts.
First, after a short period in which Alien Tort Statute (ATS) litigation was
in vogue, the Supreme Court's recent ATS decisions have put a damper on
international human rights litigation in federal court.229 But the ATS is a statute
governing federal subject-matter jurisdiction.2 30 Much like Article III, federal
subj ect-matter jurisdiction statutes do not bind state courts, 231 and indeed, federal
jurisdictional law is premised on the backstop of state courts of general
requirement operates as a limitation on the power normally exercised by a legislative body."); Michael
C. Dorf, Supreme Court Requires "Concrete" Injury for Standing, VERDICT (May 18, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/05/18/supreme-court-requires-concrete-injury-standing
[https://perma.cc/52XB-L6MA] ("Congressional authorization of private lawsuits to compel
enforcement could. . . be seen as an effort to shift power from the president to Congress. Accordingly,
prior standing cases expressly invoke separation of powers.").
225. See supra notes 213-216.
226. For example, in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, the Court entertained but
ultimately rejected multiple circuits' interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act that
provided for exclusive state court jurisdiction. 565 U.S. 368 (2012) (citing cases and statutory language).
Other statutes impliedly grant state courts exclusive jurisdiction over low-value federal claims. For
example, the federal question statute included an amount-in-controversy requirement until 1980, see 94
Stat. 2369 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to remove amount-in-controversy requirement), and
some federal law claims retain special amount-in-controversy requirements, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1337(a) (2012) (amount-in-controversy for claims under 49 U.S.C. §§ 11706, 14706).
227. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (2012) (limiting removal of FELA claims).
228. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
229. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-17 (2013) (applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality to claims under the ATS); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 728-38 (2004) (defining requirements for ATS jurisdiction).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Sosa, 542 U.S at 729 ("All Members of the Court agree
that § 1350 is only jurisdictional.").
231. Professor Coleman made a similar observation about other Roberts Court subject-matter
jurisdiction decisions. See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307, 360-65
(2014).
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232jurisdiction. Lawyers have brought international human rights cases in state
courts for decades. 233 If one of these cases were removed to federal court, a
finding of no jurisdiction under the ATS should result in remand to state
court 234-and it has.235 (Note also that many ATS cases are founded on state law
causes of action,236 so they are not always candidates for federal question
jurisdiction.237) Indeed, some plaintiffs have filed putative ATS suits and state
court cases on the same claims.238 Admittedly there are other hurdles to
successful international cases in state courts.239 But because many of these limits
are judicially created doctrines, state courts could change those too. 240
A related set of responses is also available to the Supreme Court's decisions
holding that habeas petitions based on the Vienna Convention on Consular
241Relations are subject to state procedural-default rules. While commentators
have lamented this as an example of the United States flouting international
law,242 the situation was more complex than it seemed. For present purposes, the
232. For example, the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction essentially
allocates cases between federal and state courts based on potential recovery. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2012).
233. See Paul L. Hoffman, The Application ofInternational Human Rights Law in State Courts:
A View from California, 18 INT'L LAW. 61, 65 (1984); Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International
Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 9, 11 (2013). For an
interesting parallel, note that the Iowa Supreme Court, interpreting the Iowa Constitution, rejected the
Supreme Court's recent limits on finding causes of actions directly under the federal Constitution (i.e.,
Bivens). See Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017) (making this point and collecting sister-
state cases).
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (limiting removal to "any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction").
235. See, e.g., Miner v. Begum, 8 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, No. 99-20027, 2000
WL 554953 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2000); Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., No. 96-2139, 1996 WL
601431, at *9-10 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996).
236. See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 233, at 15-17 (collecting sources). This includes the
claims involved in the Supreme Court's major ATS decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). But see Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D.
Tex. 1994) (finding, unusually, subject-matter jurisdiction based on a federal common law of foreign
relations). Diversity jurisdiction is also unavailable in many of these cases because it applies to foreign-
citizen plaintiffs suing foreign-citizen defendants. See U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
238. See Ayemou v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 312 F. App'x 24 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing federal
and state actions against Dow Chemical and Shell Oil for chemical exposure in the Ivory Coast); Hereros
ex rel. Riruako v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 232 F. App'x 90, 93 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing overlapping federal and D.C. suits); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 122-25
(2d Cir. 2001) (adjudicating the Bhopal disaster ATS case and noting overlapping suits filed in state
courts).
239. See, e.g., Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 233, at 17-20.
240. Personal jurisdiction presents an obstacle to these suits that state courts cannot change. See
infra Part I.D. At a minimum, though, these state options could help with cases against US-based
defendants or defendants engaged in relevant conduct within the United States (thus supporting specific
jurisdiction). See id
241. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375
(1998).
242. See supra note 95 (collecting sources).
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most interesting aspect of Medellin v. Texas was a seemingly tossed off reference
to the State of Oklahoma in Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in the
243judgment. In a paragraph explaining the low cost of an evidentiary hearing,
Justice Stevens noted that this "is a cost that the State of Oklahoma
unhesitatingly assumed." 244 In a footnote, Justice Stevens explained that, in
another habeas case, an Oklahoma state court honored the United States'
obligations under the Vienna Convention and granted an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the violation of the Vienna Convention prejudiced the
defendant.24 5 Justice Stevens's opinion was not only a plaudit to Oklahoma, but
246
also was a signal to other states that this option was available to them as well.
The Supreme Court of Nevada took Justice Stevens up on his suggestion and
ordered an evidentiary hearing in a Vienna Convention case 24 7 -a hearing that
ultimately led the lower court to vacate the petitioner's death sentence on Vienna
Convention grounds.248 Currently, the Supreme Court of Ohio is considering this
249issue, and other states could follow suit.
State courts are not the only bodies that can give effect to the Vienna
Convention. State legislatures could adjust state habeas procedures by statute.
State executives can act too, and indeed the Governor of Oklahoma commuted
250
the death sentence of the habeas petitioner in the example above. More
generally, there are substantial opportunities in the American system for states
to play a role in international affairs, 25 1 including in treaty implementation.252
States have been active in implementing private law treaties such as the
243. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 536-37 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
244. Id. at 537.
245. See id. at 537 n.4 (citing Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623 (Okla. Crim.
App. May 13, 2004)).
246. This is a different type of Supreme Court signal than those addressed by Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 966-71 (2016), but no less clear.
247. See Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *3 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012).
248. See Gutierrez v. State, Order Post Evidentiary Hearing, No. CR94-1795B at 12-34 (Nev.
2d. Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2017).
249. For background on this case, see generally Loza v. Mitchell, 766 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2014).
250. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 537 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
251. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control
Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457,499-527 (2004) (collecting examples); Peter
J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649 (2002) (offering a
theory of state involvement in foreign affairs).
252. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 251, at 499-506. For example, at least one state has deviated from
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters. The Supreme Court held that use of the Convention is optional. See Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 529 (1987). New Jersey state
courts accept that the Convention is optional, but as one state court explained, "we perceive no conflict
with federal supremacy, if, in exercising the option to resort to the Convention, we are more generous
in our use of the Convention's procedures than the United States' courts." Husa v. Laboratoires Servier
SA, 740 A.2d 1092, 1095 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
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International Wills Convention, 253 but arguments in favor of state participation
are not limited to private law.254 There may be reasons to be cautious about states
255
implementing international law, but this Section demonstrates that such
opportunities exist.
D. Personal Jurisdiction in State Courts
Although state courts are not bound by Article III standing law, the
Supreme Court's constitutional decisions on personal jurisdiction apply directly
256in state courts. In other words, state courts cannot deviate from personal
jurisdiction law as they have done from other procedural doctrines described
herein. However, state courts may be able to skirt the intention of the Supreme
Court's personal jurisdiction decisions while remaining true to those decisions
as written.
The Roberts Court's personal jurisdiction decisions have not addressed the
traditional jurisdictional basis of consent.257 States interested in increasing
personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants could treat state corporate-
registration statutes as constituting jurisdictional consent.258 Tanya Monestier
has been at the forefront of analyzing this option:259 courts in at least ten states
253. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, 12 I.L.M. 1302,
Oct. 26,1973, incorporated in, UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. I, pt. 10 (2010); see also Ku, supra note 251,
at 501-04.
254. See, e.g., David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 95, 117-19 (2013); Ku, supra note 251, at 521-26.
255. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 251, at 468-70 (collecting sources); Spiro, supra note 251, 686-97
(collecting sources).
256. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. In
theory, personal jurisdiction in federal court could be broader than in state court-the Fifth Amendment
may allow more than the Fourteenth. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct
1773, 1784 (2017) (leaving this question open); Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. V. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484
U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (same). But state courts would lackjurisdiction in any case that failed the federal
court test as well.
257. See, e.g., Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95-96 (1917)
(finding that consent is a valid basis for personal jurisdiction); Pennoyerv.Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)
(acknowledging jurisdiction based on "voluntary appearance").
258. See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of
Consent, 36 CARDozo L. REv. 1343, 1363 n.109 (2015) (collecting statutes for every state).
259. Seeid at 1377-1401.
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have found general jurisdiction based on corporate-registration consent,260 and
courts in another six states have found specific jurisdiction on this basis.261
The Supreme Court's recent decisions on personal jurisdiction have
seemingly nudged state actors both towards and away from finding consent-
based personal jurisdiction. On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Delaware
relied on Daimler and Goodyear to hold that its state corporate-registration
statute did not confer personal jurisdiction.262 On the other hand, as a conscious
response to Daimler, New York legislators have proposed at least four bills to
amend state registration law to make jurisdictional consent express.263 None of
this is to say that such statutes would pass constitutional muster-in addition to
264direct challenges under the Due Process Clause, these statutes also must
survive objections as unconstitutional conditions265 and restraints on interstate
commerce.266 But consent-based jurisdiction remains a potential channel for
states to reject the Supreme Court's procedural retrenchment.
E. State Court Assessment
This Section shows that state courts have at times exercised their
prerogative to deviate from the Supreme Court's decisions on the Federal Rules
260. See, e.g., Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1991) (Pa.); Bohreer v. Erie
Ins. Exch., 165 P.3d 186, 191-94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 864-
65 (Ga. 1992); Confederation of Can. Life Ins. Co. v. Vega y Arminan, 144 So. 2d 805, 808-10 (Fla.
1962); Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 89-90 (Minn. 1991); Read
v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So. 2d 1229, 1230-31 (Miss. 1987); Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex
Indus., Inc., 576 A.2d 942, 943-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
861 P.2d 270,272-74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Augsbury Corp. v. Petrokey Corp., 470 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Green Mountain Coll. v. Levine, 139 A.2d 822, 824-25 (Vt. 1958); see also
Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 171-77 (Kan. 2006) (the corporate-registration statute has
since been repealed). The Oregon Supreme Court recently interpreted its statute as not providing this
consent. See Figueroa v. BNSF Ry. Co., 390 P.3d 1019, 1030 (Or. 2017).
261. See, e.g., Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695, 697-99 (1st Cir. 1984)
(N.H.); Grey Line Tours v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987); Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 162 So. 756, 757-59 (La. 1935); Springle v. Cottrell
Eng'g Corp., 391 A.2d 456,459-69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 328 N.W.2d 467,
469-70 (Neb. 1982); Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Interstate Pipe Co., 253 P. 66, 69-70 (Okla. 1926); Eure
v. Morgan Jones & Co., 79 S.E.2d 862, 863-68 (Va. 1954).
262. See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 125-26 (Del. 2016) (citing Goodyear
Dunlop Tires v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011), and Daimler v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014))
(overruling Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109-16 (Del. 1988)).
263. See S.B. 4846, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); A.B. 6714, 238th Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2015); S.B. 7078, 237th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014); A.B. 9576, 237th Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2014). Most states' registrations statutes only imply consent to personal jurisdiction. But in
Pennsylvania, and perhaps someday in New York, consent to jurisdiction is express in the relevant
statute. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (2017).
264. See, e.g., Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) (referring to implied
jurisdictional consent as "Alice in Wonderland").
265. See D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and
Appointment ofan Agent: An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1990).
266. See, e.g., T. Griffin Vincent, Toward A Better Analysis for General Jurisdiction Based on
Appointment of Corporate Agents, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 461, 482-85 (1989).
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of Civil Procedure, Article III, and international law.267 State court deviations
from Twombly and Iqbal, for example, are not just a dream of law professors and
the plaintiffs' bar. These state court decisions are constitutionally valid, and they
represent real opportunities for advocates of private enforcement and access to
justice who believe they have been shut down in the Supreme Court. But, to the
extent that we expect state courts to be vehicles for justice and enforcement,
those courts must be proficient and available-and that takes effort and attention.
The over-emphasis on federal courts may be obscuring something important.
That said, not all state court options are created equal. State court deviations
on standing are the most insulated from erosion by federal decisions.268 State
courts are free to confer standing more broadly than federal courts and apply
broader state law standing doctrine to federal law claims.269 If defendants attempt
to remove such claims to federal court, these cases will be remanded when
federal standing does not exist, leaving state courts free to adjudicate the
underlying issues.270 Thus, the Supreme Court's standing decisions in Spokeo,
Lujan, and others-and perhaps its decisions on other aspects of
justiciability27 -are the broadest invitations to state courts.272
Decisions on the Federal Rules also do not apply in state courts, but state
decisions on pleading, summary judgment, and class actions are only effective if
cases remain in those state courts.273 And while plaintiffs select the initial forum,
if defendants can remove cases to federal courts, then federal procedure will
274
reign. Significantly, this is the alignment in many cases that attempt to enforce
federal statutory rights,275 which would create federal question jurisdiction.276 A
state legislature might obviate the need to plead a federal question by creating a
state law cause of action, though an aggressive Supreme Court could find that
277federal law preempts the state law (thus leaving a federal question in place).
267. See supra Parts m.A-D.
268. See infra Part II.B.
269. See infra Part I.B. Although state courts may confer standing more broadly than the federal
courts, they may not be able to restrict standing for federal law claims. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947).
270. See supra Part m.C.
271. See supra note 204.
272. See Clopton, supra note 65 (exploring these invitations in more detail).
273. See supra Part II.A.
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012). See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958,13-27 (1992)
(discussing the significance of removal for corporate defendants); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1468-83
(2008) (connecting Purcell and CAFA).
275. Many, but not all-the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for example, limits removal of
some claims originally filed in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2012).
276. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (federal questions). Indeed, federal statutory claims are the
focus of Burbank and Farhang's work cited supra notes 19, 74.
277. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); see also Coleman, supra note 231, at
320-24 (collecting cases from the Roberts Court). Similarly, when Congress recently federalized the
law of trade secret misappropriation, it impliedly gave defendants the option to elect federal court
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Congress also can undercut state procedural reform by making more cases
removable to federal courts.278 For example, the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) sweeps more putative class actions into federal court.27 CAFA, it
seems, was motivated in large part by state courts deviating from federal class
action law-eerily familiar to the deviations described above.280 CAFA is
particularly effective in this regard because it applies to putative class actions
even if federal courts ultimately deny certification. 2 81
State courts' attempts to deviate from arbitration law are the least effective.
Arbitration was noticeably absent from this Section, and the reason is that the
Court's arbitration jurisprudence derives from the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), a federal statute with preemptive power over inconsistent state laws.282
Despite the persistent efforts of Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the FAA applies in state courts.283 So while state courts
could exhibit hostility to arbitration sotto voce-as Justice Scalia seemingly
accused the California courts2 84 -they cannot use state law to escape the FAA.285
In sum, state courts have deviated from a range of federal procedural
decisions, but those deviations vary in their ability to withstand removal and
preemption. To put it another way, many of the Supreme Court's most
devastating decisions for court access and private enforcement are linked to the
work of Congress-e.g., federal statutes preempting state law, establishing
procedural law, when previously many of these cases remained in state court. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836
(2012) (as amended by the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016).
278. See, e.g., supra note 41 (discussing Shady Grove). The same effect would result from
statutes providing exclusive federal jurisdiction.
279. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
Indeed, federal courts routinely retain jurisdiction over cases removed under CAFA after denying class
certification. See infra note 281. Note also that some federal procedural rules will apply in state court
when federal substantive law is at issue. See supra note 106 (discussing "Reverse Erie").
280. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff& Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156
U. PA. L. REv. 1649 (2008) (finding that CAFA supporters were motivated by concerns of the
"anomalous" state court that would improperly certify a nationwide class).
281. See, e.g., Wright Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Corp., 841 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (retaining
jurisdiction); Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); Buetow v. A.L.S.
Enters., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet,
Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United Steel Int'l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d
1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir.
2009) (same); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1015-17
(2006) (presaging this result).
282. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012); see also supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text
283. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,342 (2011) ("[A]lthough these statistics
are not definitive, it is worth noting that California's courts have been more likely to hold contracts to
arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts.").
285. For a potential counterexample, see infra Part E (public enforcement).
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286federal jurisdiction, or permitting removal. Though it is little solace to
defeated plaintiffs to hear that they should divide their anger between at least
two branches, this insight is important conceptually for understanding (and
reforming) civil justice.287
III.
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
The previous Section outlined how state courts could deviate from federal
approaches that seem to restrict private enforcement and access to justice. But
288
courts are not the only actors. This Section looks to state public enforcement
as a response to the Roberts Court's curtailment of private litigation, especially
private aggregate litigation.289 The theme here is that, in many areas, public suits
may be substitutes for private suits that are cutoff by federal procedure. By
"substitutes," I do not mean perfect substitutes-as explored throughout, public
enforcement may not exactly match displaced private enforcement with respect
to remedies, compensation, or process. But public enforcement at least represents
an imperfect substitute, lessening the blow from federal procedural
retrenchment.290 And, in theory, the right state legislative and executive action
could push public enforcement closer to substitutability. 29 1
Before beginning this analysis, two caveats are in order. First, public
enforcement is not limited to the states-federal agencies routinely enforce
federal law, and many of the Roberts Court's procedural decisions leave open
federal public enforcement as well. While I mention a few illustrative examples
of federal enforcement in the forthcoming survey, the target of this Section
remains state public enforcement. Second, as explained throughout, the "data"
in this Section are more impressionistic than the state-by-state reviews above.
But like that earlier analysis, this Section both explains the alternative pathways
and offers examples of these alternatives in action.292
286. Another way to understand these conclusions is that retrenching judges or litigants might
look for doctrines based in federal preemption or subject-matter jurisdiction to ensure against state
deviations.
287. There also may be reasons to think differently about choices made by the Supreme Court
and those made by Congress. See infra Conclusion.
288. A simple legislative solution would be for Congress to overrule by statute every offending,
non-constitutional federal procedural decision. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (cataloging cases overridden by
Congress). There is not much to add to this possible but highly unlikely idea.
289. There is not much to say about political branch responses to decisions on pleading and
summary judgment, other than to repeat that legislation could address these topics.
290. Public enforcement may be closer to a perfect substitute with respect to deterrence than
compensation or due process. See infra notes 453-457 and accompanying text.
291. As explored throughout, public enforcement faces significant resource constraints, though
there are legislative and enforcement tools available to leverage those resources to great effect.
292. Unlike state court rejection, using public enforcement to respond to federal procedural




A. Class Action Substitutes
As described above, the Roberts Court has seemingly made it more difficult
to certify federal class actions.293 CAFA compounds this effect by making it
easier to get putative class actions into federal court, and thus easier to evade
state alternatives. 294
Enter public enforcement. State executive enforcers may be able to fill the
shoes of class action litigants while avoiding the requirements of Rule 23. State
legislatures also may authorize "private attorneys general" to pursue public
enforcement.295 This Section reviews these options at length, in part because this
analytic work applies to many issues taken up in future Sections as well.
1. Attorney General Suits
The first potential intervention is direct government litigation. Government
suits could take the form of traditional public enforcement,296 or they could look
297
more like representational actions on behalf of state residents. For centuries,
public actors have brought representational suits on behalf of their citizens (or
subjects), often labeled "parens patriae" actions. 298 Today, state attorneys
general have parens patriae authority under numerous federal statutes and often
under state law, 299 and this authority frequently applies in common class action
areas300 such as securities, o0 antitrust,302 employment,303 and consumer law.304
Importantly, public suits are not subject to certification under Federal
Rule 23,305 even if they are seeking remedies that private class actions could
293. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
295. One might object to referring to private attorneys general as "public" enforcement. See infra
Part EI.A.2. This label is useful for structuring the argument, but it is not analytically necessary. Either
way, federal procedural decisions may not constrain such suits.
296. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement ofFederal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698
(2011) (collecting examples of state attorneys general enforcing federal statutes).
297. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-05
(1982) (parens patriae). See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012).
298. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-05; Lemos, supra note 297, at 492-98. Although its technical
meaning is narrower, the term parens patriae has been used to describe governmental actions that seek
to vindicate private rights.
299. See Lemos, supra note 297, at 495-98 (collecting statutes).
300. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STuD. 811 (2010) (identifying common subject matters for class
action litigation); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) (same).
301. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-53 (McKinney 2016) (Martin Act).
302. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2012) (Sherman Act).
303. Title VII, for example, expressly includes states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c), 2000e-7
(2012).
304. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2012) (providing state enforcement of federal consumer law).
305. Of course, states may require certification or other procedures for parens patriae suits.
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theoretically pursue.306 Indeed, some public-enforcement authorities were
expressly adopted with class actions in mind. For example, the Second Circuit
explained that "Congress empowered state attorneys general to investigate and
prosecute antitrust abuses on behalf of consumers stymied by Rule 23's
certification and notification hurdles."307 Moreover, the Supreme Court recently
confirmed that parens patriae actions are not class actions, and therefore they
fall outside the reach of CAFA. 308 This means that more of these suits can remain
in state court, insulated from federal procedure. 309
In practice, there are many examples of parens patriae actions filed in
parallel with class actions. Perhaps the most famous example involved state suits
against tobacco companies,310 which proceeded despite various courts denying
certification to private class actions. 311 The tobacco cases are not alone. 312
Indeed, in its opinion denying certification of a class action against H & R Block,
the Southern District of Georgia observed in dictum that "denial of certification
does not, however, operate to preclude any state agency from initiating a state
law parens patriae action. "3 13 California later sued H & R Block over the same
program.3 14
306. See, e.g., Washington v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 848(9th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he
Attorneys General have statutory authority to sue in parens patriae and need not demonstrate standing
through a representative injury nor obtain certification of a class in order to recover on behalf of
individuals.").
307. New York ex rel. Vacco v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44,46 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Act); see H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, at 6-7 (1976). The Mississippi Attorney General
also lobbied for greater parens patriae authority to make up for a lack of class action options under state
law. See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014).
308. See Mississippi ex rel. Hood, 134 S. Ct. 736; Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661,
667 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that parens patriae actions are not removable as "class actions" under
CAFA).
309. For examples of state public actions remanded to state courts on this basis, see Hawai'i ex
rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., 761 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Standard & Poor's Rating Agency
Litig., 23 F. Supp. 3d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Louisiana v. Zealandia Holding Co., Inc., No. 13-6724,
2014 WL 1378874 (E.D. La. Apr. 8,2014); West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
No. 13-1603 (FLW), 2014 WL 793569 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2014).
310. See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007)
(discussing tobacco litigation); Richard P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General
Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine ofParens Patriae, 74 TUL. L.REV. 1859(2000) (same).
311. See, e.g., Cosentino v. Philip Morris Inc., No. Civ.A. MDL-L-5135-97, 1998 WL 34168879
(N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998) (remanded to state court after finding lack of jurisdiction).
312. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the
Paradox ofPublic Litigation, 74 LA. L. REv. 397 (2014) (discussing private and public suits against
BP). In some circumstances, courts have denied class certification because parallel public suits were
"superior" under Rule 23(b)(3)). See, e.g., Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 213 (9th Cir.
1975) (finding no abuse of discretion in dismissing class action when class is adequately represented by
the Attorney General); Pennsylvania v. Budget Fuel Oil Co., 122 F.R.D. 184, 185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(denying class certification because parens patriae action deemed superior). Maryland so provided by
statute. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-209(c) (West 2017).
313. Buford v. H & R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 364 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
314. See California v. H & R Block, Inc., No. C 06-2058 SC, 2006 WL 2669045 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
18, 2006) (remanding government suit to state court).
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The H & R Block experience is suggestive of a strategy by which state
agencies could look to decisions denying class certification as a potential trigger
for public enforcement. Certification denials might signal good cases, as class
counsel presumably would not have invested resources in a putative class
action-especially one with suspect chances at certification-unless there was
something to the merits of the complaint.316 Moreover, public actors stepping
into cases midstream may benefit from the efforts undertaken by private parties
317before certification was denied. In short, this version of "tagalong" public
enforcement could make up for federal courts undermining private
enforcement.3 1 8
The aforementioned California suit against H & R Block resembles this
suggested strategy-a public suit following the denial of class certification.
An illustrative federal example is the recent employment litigation against Cintas
Corporation.320 In that case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) intervened in an ongoing class action but essentially sat out of the
litigation. 32 1 That is, until the federal court denied class certification, at which
point the EEOC took the reins. 322 The EEOC ultimately settled this case on
behalf of the putative class.323 In other words, a public agency substituted for
private enforcement once class certification was denied.324
Agencies also could look to class settlements for potential cases. Much has
been written about the potential for class settlements to undercompensate and
under-deter,325 and the tightening of certification rules should reduce the
315. See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285
(2016) (discussing public-private signaling) [hereinafter Clopton, Redundant Enforcement].
316. Indeed, the investment of resources may be a clearer signal than filing a complaint with an
agency or seeking a whistleblower award. See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise
Reduction: The Screening Value ofQui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169 (2014).
317. Rule 23(c)(1)(A) directs courts to decide certification "at an early practicable time," but at a
minimum these decisions occur after plaintiffs' preparation and filing of a complaint.
318. See Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 318-24.
319. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
320. See EEOC v. Cintas Corp., Nos. 04-40132, 06-12311, 2011 WL 3359622 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
4,2011).
321. Id at * 1-2.
322. Id
323. See Press Release, EEOC, Cintas Corporation to Pay $1.5 Million to Settle EEOC Class Sex
Discrimination Lawsuit, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1 1-30-15.cfm
[https://perma.cc/4YRP-JTHD].
324. One might wonder whether the statute of limitations would limit this strategy. In certain
circumstances, the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for individual claims. See Am.
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). New York State argued that American Pipe tolling
also should apply to public representational actions. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations Grounds at *7-16, New York v. Intel Corp., No.
09-827 (LPS), 2011 WL 3360366 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2011). The District of Delaware ruled against New
York but did not altogether reject this argument. See New York er rel. Schneiderman v. Intel Corp., Civ.
No. 09-827-LPS, 2011 WL 6100408 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 2011).
325. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1494 (2013). Cy pres settlements have received particularly harsh treatment in the literature.
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expected value of class litigation.326 If state attorneys general believe that Rule
23 is reducing the value of class settlements, then they might look to those
settlements as triggers for public litigation.327 Under CAFA, state attorneys
general are notified of class settlements involving their residents.32 8 States may
respond to these notices by formally objecting to the settlement,329 but states also
could respond with public suits of their own. 330
This is exactly what happened with respect to claims of false advertising
and unfair competition against IntelliGender, the maker of a fetal gender
prediction test.331 Pursuant to a class settlement, IntelliGender agreed to pay $10
to each class member who received an inaccurate gender prediction332 and to
make a cy pres donation of $40,000 worth of product.3 33 Dissatisfied with the
outcome, the California Attorney General brought suit on the same claims, and
the Ninth Circuit held that the state could pursue civil penalties and injunctive
relief on behalf of residents regardless of the class settlement.3 34 Similarly,
despite a multibillion-dollar class settlement, New York and Massachusetts
recently filed suit in New York state court seeking penalties from Volkswagen
and its leaders for its emissions deception.335
The foregoing suggestions relied on certification denials or settlements to
signal public enforcement, but public enforcers also could respond with more
generalized policies to identify suitable cases for public enforcement. State
326. See, e.g., id at 1498-99 (observing that more onerous requirements for the certification of
litigation classes as compared with settlement classes may reduce settlement values); Zachary D.
Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow ofPreclusion, 90 IND. L.J. 1387, 1409-10 (2015)
(applying this logic to transnational class actions in which certification may be denied).
327. See Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315. Professor Howard Erichson has
identified "red flags" in class settlements. Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red
Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859 (2016). Erichson suggests these red
flags are relevant to professional responsibility, and this Article suggests they might be signals to public
enforcers too.
328. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2012). See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice
Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008) (discussing CAFA notice).
329. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorneys General of Alaska et al. in Opposition to the
Proposed Settlement Agreement, Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 05-21251-CIV); see also Sharkey, supra note 328, at 1989 (citing aforementioned brief).
330. For example, public enforcers might scrutinize class settlements for unusual terms that risk
under-deterrence. See supra note 327.
331. Califomiav. IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014).
332. The product itself cost $29.95. See Appellee's Opening Brief at 9, California v.
IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169(9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-56806).
333. See IntelliGender, 771 F.3d at 1175 (discussing Gram v. IntelliGender, No. 2:10-CV-04210
(C.D. Cal. filed June 7, 2010)). It does not appear that "product" refers to gender-prediction tests, though
the exact product is not specified. See Brief of Appellee at Exhibit 1, California v. IntelliGender, LLC,
771 F.3d 1169(9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-56806).
334. 771 F.3d at 1175-78. Note, however, that California could not pursue pure compensatory
relief on behalf of residents. Id at 1179-82.
335. See, e.g., Jack Ewing & Hiroko Tabuchi, Volkswagen Scandal Reaches All the Way to the




enforcers might decide that the difficulty of bringing a private class action should
be a factor in favor of exercising their enforcement discretion. For example,
imagine that the federal courts made it more difficult to bring a particular type
of class action-perhaps class actions alleging that "local managers' discretion
over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading
to an unlawful disparate impact." 336 State agencies might decide to target
resources to claims of this type. Although agencies are often reluctant to
publicize enforcement priorities, there is reason to suspect that public agencies
consider the efficacy of private relief when making enforcement choices.
337
Indeed, it would not be at all surprising for a government enforcer to allocate
public resources in light of private capabilities.
2. Private Attorney General Suits
The previous Section suggested that state enforcers could fill gaps created
by restrictive interpretations of the Federal Rules. This analysis assumed that
public resources were available or could be shifted among priorities. But public
resources are scarce, and indeed, resource constraints were an animating purpose
of the private-enforcement revolution.339 Professors Gilles and Friedman
suggested that states hire private firms on contingency to pursue similar goals
without public resources.3 40 Another option looks to private attorneys general.
"Private attorney general" is a capacious and contested term. 341 I use it here to
refer to a limited set of actions, exemplified by California's Private Attorney
General Act (PAGA), which comprises another potential response to federal
procedural limits.342
In 2003, the California legislature adopted PAGA to permit private
enforcement of various provisions of the State's labor law.343 The private
336. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344 (2011).
337. For example, Urska Velikonja showed that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) is particularly interested in types of enforcement cases that are difficult for private parties to win.
See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC's Fair Fund
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331 (2015) (discussing an SEC role in cases against investment
advisors, broker-dealers, and investment banks).
338. For a collection of sources (and a model of institutional design), see generally Clopton,
Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 314-17.
339. See, e.g., Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 315. For example, providing
attorney fees or other incentives could encourage private enforcement even for negative-value claims.
See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 14, at 21-31; Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 782 (2011) (surveying mechanisms to encourage private enforcement).
340. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623,669 (2012); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max
Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARv. L. REV. 853, 864-75 (2014) (discussing
"revolving funds" and other options for public enforcement in light of budget constraints).
341. See, e.g., Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 288 (collecting sources).
342. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5 (West 2017). See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, To
Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1203 (2013) (discussing PAGA).
343. See 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 906 (S.B.796, § 2); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699.5.
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344attorney general basically stands in the shoes of the state enforcement agency.
According to a State Senate Committee analysis: "Arguably, in a perfect world,
there would be no need for the right to act as [private attorney general], yet the
fact remains that due to continuing budgetary and staffing constraints, full,
appropriate and adequate Labor Code enforcement is unrealizable if done solely
by the Agency." 345 Under PAGA, employees supplement public enforcement by
suing on behalf of current and former employees, and civil penalties may be
distributed to aggrieved employees.346 Hundreds of reported cases have invoked
PAGA seeking millions of dollars in recoveries. 3 4 7
Although a PAGA suit on behalf of employees sounds a lot like a class
action, courts have consistently held that it is not treated as one.34 8 State and
federal courts regularly permit PAGA actions on behalf of aggrieved employees
without class certification. 349 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that PAGA suits
(like parens patriae actions350 ) may not be removed under CAFA, thus insulating
them from federal procedure more generally.351
Responding to federal class action decisions, plaintiffs could file PAGA
actions when class certification is denied or unlikely. Indeed, because a putative
class representative could also be a PAGA plaintiff, plaintiffs could plead class
and PAGA allegations in the alternative. For example, in 2011 Aladdin Zackaria
filed a wage-and-hour suit on behalf of himself and current and former
employees of none other than Wal-Mart. 352 Zackaria pleaded his claims as both
a class action and a PAGA suit.35 3 Wal-Mart opposed the motion for class
certification, relying in large part on Wal-Mart v. Dukes.354 The district court
agreed that class certification would be improper but permitted Zackaria to
344. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.
345. Bill Analysis, S.B. 796, Senate Comm. on Labor and Indus. Relations, 2003-2004 Reg.
Sess., at 5 (2003).
346. Section 2699(i) provides: "75 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency for
enforcement of labor laws ... and ... education of employers and employees about their rights and
responsibilities under this code, to be continuously appropriated to supplement and not supplant the
funding to the agency for those purposes; and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees." CAL. LAB. CODE§ 2699(i) (West 2017).
347. Janet Alexander observed that PAGA recoveries underperform class actions where
available. See Alexander, supra note 342, at 1237.
348. See, e.g., Gallardo v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(collecting cases). The 2014 Baumann decision, discussed infra note 351, gives even more reason to
think that PAGA actions should not require certification. See Zackaria v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 3d 949 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (making this argument).
349. See Gallardo, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (collecting cases); Zackaria, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 954-
55 (collecting cases).
350. See supra notes 298-311 and accompanying text.
351. See Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 747 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014). Removability also
might be unavailable due to lack of federal standing. See infra Part Ifl.C.
352. See Zackaria, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 951.
353. Id at 951-52.
354. Joint Brief Re: Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 27-28, 48, Zackaria v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 4954572 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2014) (No. 5:12-cv-01 520-FMO-SP).
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maintain his PAGA claim.355 The case ultimately settled, and it is hard to imagine
that Zackaria would have achieved the same recovery had he been left only with
his individual claim following the denial of class certification.356
PAGA is perhaps the clearest example of a private attorney general statute,357
but it is not the only one. Qui tam provisions, common in false claims acts, are
essentially PAGAs.358 The District of Columbia permits, 359 and California used
to permit,360 private attorney general enforcement for some consumer laws.361
These examples highlight the potential flexibility of private attorney general acts.
Statutes can be targeted to issue areas, like California's focus on labor and
consumer law. 362 They can operate as part of a more complex web of
enforcement mechanisms: the federal False Claims Act and California's PAGA
permit the government to take over enforcement, 363 and some of these statutes
provide notice and intervention rights to private parties as well.364 When such
statutes include provisions for statutory damages 365 or civil penalties 366 (as they
355. See Zackaria, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 952-60; Order Re: Motion for Class Certification, Zackaria
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. ED CV 12-1520 FMO (SPx), 2015 WL 2412103 (C.D. Cal. May 18,
2015).
356. See supra note 326 (discussing settlement values).
357. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012) (federal False Claims Act); CAL. GOv'T CODE §§
12650-12656 (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1201-1211 (2017); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/1-
8 (2017). See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J.
616 (2013) (discussing qui tam provisions).
358. See Alexander, supra note 342, at 1221-26.
359. D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1)(D) (2017) (allowing public interest suits on behalf of
consumers); see, e.g., Nat'l Consumers League v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, 46 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C.
2014).
360. Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 589, 605-06 (2005) (discussing California's now-repealed unfair-competition law).
361. So-called "citizen suit" provisions also exist and are common in environmental statutes. See
Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 294 (collecting sources). But these provisions
typically do not authorize compensatory damages, and they require certification when used in class
actions.
362. See supra notes 342-347 and accompanying text.
363. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (False Claims Act); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3 (West 2017)
(PAGA).
364. See Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 304-05 (discussing notice and
intervention in various statutory schemes that allow overlapping public and private enforcement). A
legislature also could prioritize among enforcement types: the private attorney general statute could
provide that such an action would only be permissible if superior alternatives were unavailable. Cf FED.
R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3); see also supra note 312 (collecting cases in which courts found public enforcement
superior to a class action).
365. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919) (an award of
statutory damages satisfies due process); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) (citing Williams).
366. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (applying Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eight Amendment). See generally Colleen P. Murphy, Reviewing Congressionally Created
Remedies for Excessiveness, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 651 (2012) (discussing various species of constitutional
review of congressionally created remedies).
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often do 367), then they seemingly should face weaker remedial scrutiny than
analogous suits seeking punitive damages.368
Despite recent federal court decisions cutting back on class actions, there
has not been a boom in PAGAs across the country. Indeed, California has
eliminated private attorney general enforcement of its consumer laws,369 and it
added new limits on PAGA labor actions.37 0 Perhaps the infrequency of PAGAs
shows a lack of imagination from policymakers, but more likely it reflects some
combination of a lack of appetite for increased enforcement and some unease
with this unusual procedural form.371
To review, the Supreme Court's class action jurisprudence has made it
more difficult for private parties to maintain class actions and thus has undercut
private enforcement as a regulatory tool. State courts need not follow their
federal counterparts, but CAFA's inclusion of even putative class actions make
this at best an incomplete response.372 If state executives are worried about the
effect that class action rules have on enforcement, they might consider allocating
resources to cases that are denied certification or case types that are difficult to
certify. States also could achieve similar effects through private attorney
general acts.374 These acts will require legislative action, which to date has been
in short supply, but they remain available for interested legislatures.
B. Arbitration Substitutes
A second line of procedural jurisprudence relates to arbitration. 375 Obvious
responses to these decisions would take the form of congressional action or
authorized federal rulemaking. Indeed, Congress has considered bills to amend
the FAA, 7  and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau adopted a since-
overturned rule regulating certain arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. 377
367. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012) (False Claims Act); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f) (West
2017) (PAGA).
368. See Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007) (holding that punitive
damages award based on a desire to punish for harming nonparties violates due process); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 572 (1996) (same). For decisions declining to apply the punitive
damages standards to statutory penalties, see, for example, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum,
719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012);
Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007). There is much more to say
about this idea, but this is not the place to say it.
369. See Morrison, supra note 360.
370. See supra note 346.
371. See infra Part JV.B (discussing the politics of enforcement).
372. See supra note 279.
373. See supra Part ELA.1.
374. See supra Part lf.A.2.
375. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
376. See Alexander, supra note 342, at 1209-13 (citing proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, Fair
Arbitration Act, and Consumer Mobile Fairness Act).
377. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt 1040) [hereinafter "Final Rule"]. But see Providing for Congressional Disapproval Under Chapter 8
of Title 5, United States Code, of the Rule Submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
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Of more interest here, public enforcement and private attorney general suits
could counteract the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions as well.
First, when government agencies and private attorneys general are not
parties to arbitration agreements,379 those agreements presumably do not
constrain their actions.3o Numerous state and federal courts (including the US
Supreme Court381) have permitted public enforcement in the face of private
arbitration agreements,382 and at least one federal court of appeals justified a pro-
arbitration decision because the state attorney general could step in if private
arbitration proved ineffective.38 3 It seems unlikely that arbitration clauses would
bar third parties from suing to enforce public laws that happen to touch on
contractual relationships involving arbitration clauses. To take an admittedly
absurd example, it would be strange if a court held that a defendant insulated
itself from a Clean Air Act suit brought by the state attorney general or by an
environmental nonprofit because the polluter included an arbitration clause in its
contract with the smoke-stack manufacturer. 384 Similarly, when the National
Consumer League (or the D.C. Attorney General) files a public-interest suit
under local unfair-competition law, 385 the presence of arbitration language in the
consumer contract seems beside the point.386
Relating to "Arbitration Agreements," H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017); 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808
(2012) (Congressional Review Act). See also Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What
Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 391 (2012) (discussing other
regulatory options); Zachary D. Clopton, Class Actions and Executive Power, 92 N.Y.U L. REV. 878,
885-87 (2017) (collecting federal examples).
378. Professors Gilles and Friedman also looked to public enforcement after Concepcion. See
supra note 340.
379. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) ("[The FAA]
reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.").
380. As explained below, for various reasons it seems that standing should not represent an
insurmountable obstacle to these suits either. See infra Part mI.C.
381. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 293-96 (2002) (holding that the EEOC was not
required to arbitrate disability-discrimination claim despite arbitration clause, even when the EEOC
sought victim-specific relief).
382. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 843 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 2014)
(holding that the state was not required to arbitrate employment claim despite private arbitration clause);
Jould, Inc. v. Simmons, 459 Mass. 88, 944 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Mass. 2011) (same); State ex rel. Hatch v.
Cross Country Bank, Inc., 703 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (same for invasion-of-privacy
claims); People ex rel. Cuomo v. Coventry First LLC, 915 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2009) (same for claims of
fraud and anticompetitive conduct). The occasionally cited counterexample, Olde Disc. Corp. v.
Tupman, found Delaware's special administrative proceeding for securities claims to be an obstacle to
the FAA, though this case involved an agency pursuing a remedy for a single claimant at the claimant's
behest. 1 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 1993).
383. See Iberia Credit Bureau v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2004).
384. See 42 U.S.C § 7604 (2012) (authorizing Clean Air Act citizen suits by "any person").
385. Cf Nat'l Consumers League v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, 46 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C. 2014)
(suing under D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)). The NCL is a nonprofit organization based in
Washington, D.C.
386. One potential limit on this strategy would be courts prudentially staying (or dismissing)
public enforcement actions pending private arbitration. In a recent case, the Eastern District of Louisiana
refused to preempt an EEOC lawsuit alleging transgender discrimination because of an underlying
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The foregoing analysis focused on contract nonparties, but of course
contractual employees are potential PAGA plaintiffs too. Recognizing this fact,
some employers have expressly included PAGA among those claims to which
arbitration agreements apply.387 However, California courts have found that
PAGA waivers in arbitration clauses are unconscionable, and, contrary to
current law on class waivers,389 the California Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit have held that the FAA does not preempt these PAGA-unconscionability
decisions. 390 The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion because PAGA actions
are, essentially, public enforcement in private hands: "a PAGA action is a
statutory action for penalties brought as a proxy for the state, rather than a
procedure for resolving the claims of other employees .... " That said, the
Supreme Court has not always cottoned to Ninth Circuit arbitration decisions,392
and other federal courts have begun to compel arbitration of qui tam suits.393
PAGA non-preemption thus may not last-though the aforementioned suits by
contract nonparties are on stronger footing.394
Assuming that state actors or private attorneys general were able to sue,
their efforts could target cases involving arbitration clauses through various
mechanisms. Public or private parties could scrutinize cases in which courts
compel arbitration, particularly arbitration without access to class procedures.39 5
More aggressively, agencies could direct enforcement resources toward entities
that include arbitration agreements in their contracts. Imagine that the Attorney
General of Vermont were to conclude that arbitration unduly interfered with the
State's consumer laws. The AG could announce that, as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, the department will focus its investigative resources on entities that
arbitration clause, but (unusually) it stayed the public litigation pending the outcome of the private
arbitration. See Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, No. 15-CV-1 161, 2016 WL 879995 (E.D. La.
Mar. 8,2016) (denying motion to reconsider order staying the EEOC's claims); Broussardv. First Tower
Loan, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d 540 (E.D. La. 2015); Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 150 F. Supp.
3d 709 (E.D. La. 2015) (granting motion to stay EEOC claims pending arbitration).
387. See, e.g., Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the FAA did not preempt California rule barring waivers of representative PAGA claims); Brown v.
Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 503 (2011) (same); see also Alexander, supra note 342, at
1230 (making a similar observation).
388. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014).
389. See supra notes 57-58 (citing cases).
390. See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 436; Brown, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 503.
391. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 436; see also Alexander, supra note 342, at 1232-33 (making a similar
observation).
392. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Rent-A-Center, W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
393. See Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 WL 394875, at *8 (SD.
Ohio Jan. 31, 2013) (compelling arbitration of qui tam claims under the False Claims Act); see also
United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 381 (4th Cir. 2008)
(collecting False Claims Act retaliation cases). Some federal court cases prior to Sakkab reached a
similar conclusion on PAGA. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS
(CWx), 2013 WL 3233211, at *37 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (compelling arbitration of PAGA claim).
394. See supra notes 379-386 and accompanying text (discussing these suits).
395. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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include arbitration clauses in consumer contracts because arbitration undermines
deterrence as compared with private litigation.396
Although the Supreme Court has been quick to find FAA preemption, 397
there are reasons to think that the FAA may not preempt this policy. For one
thing, the Supreme Court has said that the "principal purpose of the FAA is to
ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms."3 9 Nothing about this policy would have any effect on the enforceability
of arbitration agreements according to their terms. 9  In other places, the
Supreme Court has explained the FAA's purpose was "to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."400 Permitting
public enforcement has no bearing on judicial hostility, nor would public
enforcement affect arbitration's equal legal footing.4 0 1 In addition, prosecutorial
discretion is an area of strong deference to executive actors, so the burden on the
402preemption argument would be quite high. And, it is not as if a hypothetical
state attorney general would announce a policy of disfavoring arbitration for
arbitration's sake-the proposed policy aims at ineffective private
enforcement. 403 Indeed, if the true culprit were the waiver of aggregate
procedures,404 then this policy could apply to class action waivers without
accompanying arbitration clauses as well.405
396. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBrrRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION AcT § 1028(A),
(2015) [hereinafter "CFPB STUDY"].
397. See supra notes 55, 57 (citing cases).
398. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
399. Again, a state would not be a contract party. See supra notes 379-386 and accompanying
text.
400. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
401. The Supreme Court also has been wary of state contract doctrines that disfavor arbitration
as applied. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341 ("[T]he inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is
alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration."). But notably its examples were
doctrines applied to proceedings between parties to the arbitration clause-there was no discussion of
proceedings involving a contract nonparty. See id (discussing this case and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987)).
402. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2092-93 (2014) ("[W]e have traditionally
viewed the exercise of state officials' prosecutorial discretion as a valuable feature of our constitutional
system ... . Prosecutorial discretion involves carefully weighing the benefits of a prosecution against
the evidence needed to convict, the resources of the public fisc, and the public policy of the State.").
403. Such a policy could target other forms of "procedural contracting" that also undermine
private enforcement. See generally Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules
Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1329 (2012). For example, consider fee-shifting and other
litigation-related provisions in corporate bylaws and charters. See, e.g., David Skeel, The Bylaw Puzzle
in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1 (2017); Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by
Contract, 96 B.U. L. REv. 485 (2016).
404. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
405. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit held that Fair Labor Standards Act collective-action waivers
are unenforceable unless they come with an arbitration agreement. Killion v. KeHE Distribs., LLC, 761
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There is little evidence of any agency formally adopting such a policy
targeting arbitration, though agencies often remain opaque with respect to
enforcement discretion. 4 06 That said, state and federal enforcement agencies have
not been quiet with respect to arbitration. The EEOC issued the following
instructions regarding potential enforcement suits:
Charges should be taken and processed in conformity with priority
charge processing procedures regardless of whether the charging party
has agreed to arbitrate employment disputes. Field offices are instructed
to closely scrutinize each charge involving an arbitration agreement to
determine whether the agreement was secured under coercive
circumstances (e.g., as a condition of employment). The [EEOC] will
process a charge and bring suit, in appropriate cases, notwithstanding
the charging party's agreement to arbitrate.407
408Consistent with these instructions, the EEOC routinely litigates against the
backdrop of arbitration clauses.409 At the same time, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) has repeatedly expressed concern about arbitration in
consumer disputes;410 the Minnesota Attorney General sued the National
Arbitration Foundation over its consumer arbitrations;411 and public enforcement
actions frequently seek judicial relief where an analogous private action would
F.3d 574, 591-92(6thCir. 2014). Other courts have declined to follow this reasoning. See, e.g., Benedict
v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 13-cv-00119-BL, 2016 WL 1213985 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016); Mark v.
Gawker Media LLC, No. 13-cv-4347(AJN), 2016 WL 1271064 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,2016); Feamster v.
Compucom Sys., Inc., No. 7:15-CV-00564, 2016 WL 722190 (W.D. Va. Feb. 19, 2016). For other
examples of class action waivers outside of the arbitration context, see, for example, In re Yahoo! Litig.,
251 F.R.D. 459 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Bonanno v. Quizno's Franchise Co., LLC, No. 06-cv--02358-CMA-
KLM, 2009 WL 1068744 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009).
406. It is possible that an agency would announce such a policy in order to deter the use of
arbitration agreements, though I have not found it. Perhaps a better strategy would be a policy that led
regulated parties to strongly suspect an emphasis on arbitration-thus achieving deterrence, but not so
explicit as to prompt a successful preemption challenge.
407. EEOC, NOTICE No. 915.002, POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT
(1997).
408. See id.
409. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that the EEOC has
authority to seek victim-specific relief in enforcement action despite an arbitration agreement between
employee and employer); supra note 386 (discussing Broussard litigation). Indeed, the EEOC also has
attempted to convince courts that making arbitration agreements a condition of employment is contrary
to Title VII, independent of any separate discriminatory act. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp.
v. EEOC, 245 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting APA challenge to this EEOC policy). Courts have
rejected this argument, see Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1002-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases), but the EEOC
has continued to press this view. See EEOC v. Doherty Enters., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (S.D. Fla.
2015).
410. See Final Rule, supra note 377; CFPB STUDY, supra note 396.
411. Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011);
Nicole Wanlass, Note, No Longer Available: Critiquing the Contradictory Way Courts Treat Exclusive
Arbitration Forum Clauses When the Forum Can No LongerArbitrate, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2005 (2015).
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412be sent to arbitration. In none of these examples did a state or federal agency
announce a policy of dedicating enforcement resources toward entities pushing
arbitration. But these examples suggest that they might be inclined to do so-
and it would raise concerns about the sincerity of their anti-arbitration rhetoric if
they did not.413
C. Standing Substitutes
Standing doctrine also seems to close courthouse doors,414 but substitute
actions may work here as well.415 First, and again, state executive actions may
be available. Standing seems to be no limit for traditional public enforcement,416
and federal courts seem more willing to find standing for public representational
suits than for private ones.4 17 As noted above, many federal statutes authorize
public enforcement, and many states have parens patriae authority.418 Consider
again Spokeo v. Robins.419 In that case, Robins had difficulty establishing
standing to sue under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).420 But states may
enforce the FCRA too,421 so if Robins lacks standing to sue Spokeo, government
enforcers may step in.
Second, PAGAs are possible standing substitutes. Some federal courts have
found "law enforcement standing" for PAGA claims,422 tracking the Supreme
Court's view of standing for qui tam suits.423 Even if federal courts found no
424
standing, recall that many states deviate from federal standing law. California
412. See supra notes 382, 409.
413. See supra notes 403 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text
415. In addition to suggestions made here, no-standing claims are also possible in administrative
tribunals and other non-Article 111 courts to the extent that such tribunals are available. See, e.g., Gardner
v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[A]gencies are free to hear actions brought by parties
who might be without party standing if the same issues happened to be before a federal court."). These
proceedings should not transgress the judicial-power limit either, see, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856), because these cases are not justiciable cases or
controversies. See generally Clopton, supra note 65.
416. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
See generally Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing ofthe United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show
That Standing Doctrine isLookingforAnswers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2239 (1999).
417. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982); see also Lemos, supra note 297, at 497, 502 (making a similar
observation); Fallon, supra note 63, at 1081-82 (same).
418. See supra notes 297-304; see also, e.g., Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn.,
Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2002) ("When determining whether a state has parens patriae standing
under a federal statute, we ask if Congress intended to allow for such standing.").
419. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2017); see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
420. Id
421. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2012).
422. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
423. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000). In
these cases, a PAGA plaintiff may proceed even if she lacked a personal injury-in-fact.
424. See supra Part IIB.
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PAGA actions thus can be maintained in state court even if a federal court found
no standing.425
D. International Law Substitutes
426Substitute actions also could pursue international law claims. Many
putative ATS claims could be the subjects of public actions.
Following Kiobel, scholars focused on the prospect of private plaintiffs
427bringing state law suits in failed ATS cases. Public plaintiffs could take the
same advice,428 and presumably state legislatures could create PAGAs for these
claims as well. 429
A similar suggestion applies to international claims based on US statutes.
Not only could state courts interpret state statutes more broadly than parallel
federal statutes, 430 but the Supreme Court also has suggested that extraterritorial
public suits under federal statutes might be permissible even when
extraterritorial private suits would not be. 431 Indeed, last term, the Supreme Court
limited the extraterritorial effect of RICO for private but not public claims,432
despite the fact that the exact same substantive provision of RICO creates the
private and public causes of action.433
425. See, e.g., Adams v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp., No. SA CV 07-1465 AHS (MLGx),
2009 WL 7401970 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2009) (remanding PAGA case for lack of Article I standing);
see also Env't World Watch, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C05-1799 THE, 2005 WL 1867728 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 3, 2005) (remanding claim against foreign sovereign, despite the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act's grant of federal jurisdiction, because plaintiffs lacked federal court standing for
"public-interest" claim).
426. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
427. See generally Symposium, 3 U.C. IRV. L. REV. 1 (2013) (symposium issue for "Human
Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law").
428. Criminal actions also might be available in these circumstances even if civil plaintiffs could
not obtain personal jurisdiction. See infra Part IIE.
429. See supra notes 342-346 and accompanying text.
430. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a tool of federal statutory interpretation, see
supra note 87, and states deviate significantly from the federal approach to these questions. See Caleb
Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI.
L. REv. 657, 720-23 (2013).
431. In Empagran, the Supreme Court suggested more solicitude to extraterritorial public
antitrust enforcement as compared with its private analog. F. Hoffinann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 170-71 (2004); see also Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 284 n. 12
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the extraterritorial reach of securities
law could depend on whether the SEC or a private party sued).
432. RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality to the treble-damages provision of RICO). This was the position of the United
States as well. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur, RJR Nabisco, Inc.
v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138), 2015 WL 9268185.
433. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). The Court distinguished private suits based on the separate
remedial provision authorizing treble damages at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
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E. Personal Jurisdiction Substitutes
Turning finally to personal jurisdiction, note first that constitutional
personal jurisdiction law applies with equal force to public actions and to state
courts.434 Indeed, the seminal personal jurisdiction decision International Shoe
v. Washington involved a challenge to a government suit in a state court.435 For
this reason, the above-proposed substitute suits may not be viable responses to
personal jurisdiction law.
Interestingly (and perhaps troublingly), the Supreme Court's personal
jurisdiction cases might not constrain an important category of enforcement
actions: criminal prosecutions. Many federal and state decisions have held that
the Supreme Court's minimum-contacts analysis is not applicable to criminal
cases,436 and the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") has advanced this
position in some criminal prosecutions. 4 37 According to the DOJ in a recent case,
"[T]here is no case that applies a minimum-contacts analysis in determining
whether a criminal prosecution is arbitrary and fundamentally unfair under the
Due Process Clause." 4 38 The relevant decisions do not appear to distinguish
between Fifth (federal) and Fourteenth (state) Amendment due process rights, so
state prosecutors could offer the same arguments to overcome due process
barriers in state criminal prosecutions.
For better or worse, therefore, prosecutors could bring criminal actions
where civil actions are unavailable-assuming, of course, that the standards for
criminal liability are met.4 3 9 This suggestion might be particularly compelling in
areas of corporate malfeasance, where criminal and civil penalties converge and
law authorizes private restitution.440 Criminal prosecutions also might be
relevant in international law cases for which personal jurisdiction has been
434. See supra notes 77-81, 240 and accompanying text.
435. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
436. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Boyd v. Meachum, 77 F.3d
60 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1999); State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 388 A.2d
190 (N.H. 1978); Exparte Boetscher, 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Amoroso, 975
P.2d 505,508 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987); see also Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952) (permitting prosecution of individual brought into state by "forcible abduction");
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (same).
437. See, e.g., Opposition to Defendant Roger Darin's Motion to Dismiss the Criminal
Complaint, United States v. William Hayes, 118 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12 MJ 3229)
(motion denied).
438. Id. at 17.
439. The mechanism is slightly more complicated. Criminal trials in absentia are not available,
so the government instead would pursue an indictment and then seek extradition-or, perhaps cynically,
accept the shadow of the indictment as the sanction. See Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, Technology,
and National Security, 83 U. CI. L. REv. 45, 58-60 (2016) (discussing this effect in Hyazi and other
cases).
440. See generally Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1385 (2011). For example, DOJ has obtained billions of dollars in criminal restitution from
corporate defendants, much of which has been returned to victims. Id. at 1396.
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difficult to obtain.44 1 I am unaware of evidence that prosecutors are selecting
cases because civil personal jurisdiction would be unavailable, but this strategy
is possible.44 2 Tracking the two categories just mentioned (corporate
malfeasance and international law), the DOJ has recently pressed the argument
about weaker nexus requirements for criminal prosecutions in cases involving
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) scandal44 3 and Somali piracy.444
F. State-Enforcement Assessment
This Section has outlined the ways in which public enforcement can
respond to the Supreme Court's decisions on class actions, arbitration, standing,
international law, and personal jurisdiction. Public enforcement substitutes are
free from many of the constraints on state courts acting alone. 5 Public or private
attorney general suits can eschew doctrines that push courts to deny class
certification or compel arbitration." 6 Many of these suits also avoid the pull of
federal court jurisdiction.4 7 In this way, public enforcement may be particularly
meaningful when private claims are subject to removal or compelled arbitration.
Federal action may limit state public enforcement, but the requisite federal
action is not easy to come by. First, federal law could preempt state-enforcement
efforts. However, this would require Congress to overcome the presumption
against preemption of state law448 and disempower state actors from enforcing
the preemptive federal law.44 9 Federal-enforcement actions also could preclude
state enforcement by resolving claims or issues.450 Here, the federal statute
would have to permit such federal actions, the federal enforcer would have to
441. Moreover, although the standards are purportedly the same, it appears that courts are more
willing to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality for criminal cases than civil ones. See
Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of US. Criminal Law After
Morrison v. National Astralia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 166-72 (2011).
442. See, e.g., James G. Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International
Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 121 (2014).
443. See supra note 438 and accompanying text (discussing Hayes).
444. See United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
445. See supra Part EI.
446. See supra Parts EIl.A-B.
447. See, e.g., supra notes 307-309 and accompanying text (discussing parens patriae suits and
CAFA); supra note 351 and accompanying text (discussing PAGA and CAFA); supra notes 422-425
and accompanying text (discussing PAGA and standing); supra note 438 and accompanying text
(discussing state criminal prosecutions).
448. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 155-58 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This is especially significant in the
context of state police powers. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,2501 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ("In preemption analysis, courts should assume that the historic police powers
of the States are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
449. This means excluding states as authorized enforcers, see, e.g., Lemos, supra note 296, at
708-11 (collecting examples), and as parens patriae representatives, see, e.g., Lemos, supra note 297,
at 495-97.The Arizona decision may be the exception that proves the rule, given the unusual nature of
the federal immigration power. See 132 S. Ct. 2492.
450. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13-29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
2018] 461
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
initiate and resolve the claim, and a court would have to stamp the judgment.451
In other words, multiple branches of the federal government would need to make
concerted efforts for either preemption or preclusion to attach.452
But even if public suits survive this federal gauntlet, public enforcement
may not substitute perfectly for lost private suits. For one thing, public actions
are imperfect substitutes when viewed through the lens of court access. 45 Public
actions might aspire to substitute for private-enforcement deterrence, 45 4 but if
court access matters regardless of the outcome, then public enforcement must be
judged on the process it provides to represented parties. 455 For some claims, it
may be that government representation is never a meaningful substitute for an
individual day in court.456 Compensation is subject to similar concern-even if
public enforcers compensate victims, the compensation may not be sufficient.45 7
There are also formal and functional constraints on state enforcement.
Formally, statutes authorizing public enforcement do not always offer the same
remedies that are available in private suits.458 Geography also may formally
constrain state enforcement in a way that would not apply to a nationwide class
.459
action.
451. See Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 302, 305 (collecting examples of
statutes allowing and disallowing intervention or preclusion).
452. See supra notes 448-451 and accompanying text. And, if these conditions were to obtain,
that would be consistent with the constitutional structure. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
453. This Article has suggested that enforcement and court access run together, but that will not
always be the case. See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002).
454. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict ofInterest, 4 J. LEGAL STuD. 47 (1975); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and
"Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377
(2000).
455. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 297, at 531-42.
456. Whether class actions-or even individual litigation as currently practiced-constitute a
meaningful day in court is a topic for another day. Cf Resnik, supra note 16. But it is far from obvious
that a class action disposed of at summary judgment meets that standard.
457. See, e.g., Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011)
(discussing public compensation from various federal agencies); Velikonja, supra note 337, at 333
(noting that the SEC has distributed billions of dollars to investors following public-enforcement actions
under the Fair Funds program). Importantly, though, we should measure compensation against the
baseline of private suits.
458. See, e.g., Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 303-04 (collecting
examples). For example, as noted above, the California Attorney General could not pursue
compensatory relief against IntelliGender. See supra note 334.
459. Parens patriae suits, for example, are predicated on the relationship between the state and
its citizens-it would make less sense for Vermont to sue on behalf of Californians than for a Vermont
plaintiff to propose a nationwide class definition. Coordinated multistate litigation has been used in
public enforcement, see, e.g., Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 288 (collecting
sources and critics), but presumably that arrangement adds complexity and cost.
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Functionally, one substantial limit on state enforcement comes from public
resources, or lack thereof. Traditional public enforcement is expensive.460 It is
unrealistic to assume that government agencies have the capacity to bring every
enforcement case. Indeed, lawmakers often authorized private enforcement in
response to the insufficiency of public enforcement, so it is unsurprising that
public enforcement is not a perfect substitute.461
Another functional limit on state enforcement is political will. Majoritarian
pressures may make public enforcement less effective at protecting minority
462interests than private alternatives. We might also worry that public agencies
will be soft on political allies.46 3 Public enforcement may be particularly
problematic when state actors are defendants: substituting state enforcement
might systematically undermine attempts to hold state actors accountable.
Indeed, following the weakening of private remedies for police misconduct,464
Congress concluded that the federal government needed the ability to enjoin
unconstitutional police practices in the states, and it provided the DOJ with that
power in 42 U.S.C. § 14141.465 Section 14141, however, may be a cautionary
tale for public enforcement: a lack of resources and political will has hampered
the DOJ's effective use of that statute.466
Notably, these formal and functional limits are, in a sense, self-imposed. If
a state wanted to use public enforcement to respond to the Supreme Court's
procedural retrenchment, it could authorize, fund, and monitor a robust public-
enforcement program. This study thus provides a roadmap for public enforcers,
467as well as a rubric against which they can be evaluated. PAGAs also may
represent an antidote to problems of resources and executive priorities. PAGAs
are uncommon today and, where they exist, they are remedially limited.468 But
this too could be corrected in the states.
460. See, e.g., Burbank et al., supra note 4; Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315.
Public enforcers may have adopted these strategies but have not publicized them. For instrumentalist or
inherent reasons, there may be a norm against revealing enforcement priorities.
461. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 14.
462. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (developing this claim in the interjurisdictional context).
463. See, e.g., Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 315, at 323.
464. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
465. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012)
(transferred to 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601 (West 2017)).
466. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1407-12 (2000); Rachel A.
Harmon, Promoting CivilRights Through Proactive PolicingReform, 62 STAN L. REV. 1, 52-55 (2009).
467. For example, the EEOC and CFPB have been critical of the Supreme Court's arbitration
jurisprudence, and they have responded in ways explained above. See supra notes 406-412 and
accompanying text. One could imagine in-the-weeds investigations of public enforcement operations as
well as big data studies of enforcement decisions in response to the background legal landscape.
468. See supra notes 342-363.
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In sum, state enforcement in practice may represent far less than a perfect
substitute for private enforcement. But just as with state courts, it is important to
469
acknowledge that its limits are not the product of the Supreme Court alone.
IV.
THE POLITICS OF PROCEDURE
Many of the criticisms of the Roberts Court's procedural decisions boil
down to a concern that the Court is laundering substantive policymaking through
procedure.470 True enough, but we have long since recognized that the Supreme
Court is a political actor,47 1 and procedure is part of the iterative process of
politics. 472 While this Article cannot tell us whether the Supreme Court's
procedural decisions were right or wrong, we might be able to get normative
traction by considering the politics of procedure and the responses to it.
A. Reasons for Optimism
Straightforwardly, critics of Twombly and Iqbal, or Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
might revel in state court rejection or state-enforcement substitution.47 3 And they
might use this Article to agitate for more state intervention. Moreover, by
documenting state court and state-enforcement alternatives, this Article offers
some reasons for optimism about procedural federalism generally.
Part II of this Article reviewed the ways that state courts have exercised
judicial federalism. Federalism is valuable (in part) because it can generate
experimentation and diversification-states as "laboratories of democracy."4 74
But there is some concern in the literature that states. do not in fact experiment
with policy. 475 Civil procedure has long been an area of significant state
469. See supra Part H.E.
470. See supra Part I.
471. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005)
(characterizing the Supreme Court as a "political organ"). Then-Judge Posner focused on the Court's
constitutional docket, but much of his analysis applies equally outside of it.
472. After all, "procedure is power." Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition,
History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291,
1292 (2000). Saying that these decisions are part of a political process is not pejorative. Politics is but
one way to resolve policy questions.
473. After all, this is politics all the way down.
474. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."). See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2010) (offering a "nationalist" account of federalism); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994) (offering a theory of "process federalism").
475. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009).
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autonomy, and this Article provides evidence that state courts, in practice, have
used their authority to experiment with procedure.476
There is also some anecdotal evidence that procedural experimentation
diffuses among courts. In Twombly, Justice Stevens relied on state court
experiences with pleading standards to argue against "plausibility pleading."477
Many of the decisions in which state courts reject federal procedure cite to other
states doing the same.478 States that voluntarily follow federal procedure are
themselves examples of policy diffusion.479
Although this state experimentation is not systematic-there is not a central
480planner matching similar states and applying procedural treatments -the
hodgepodge of state procedural choices documented in Part II may generate
interesting data. Consider, for one example, the intersection among state
standards for pleading and summary judgment. 48 1
476. See supra Part II. This has not always been true. For example, some framers of the Federal
Rules hoped their document would be a focal point for state procedure, see Charles Alan Wright,
Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1959), while the Conformity Act before that told federal
courts to track state procedure. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 168, § 1002.
477. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
supra Part Il.A. 1 (updating results).
478. See supra Part II.A (collecting cases).
479. See supra Part II.A (collecting cases).
480. See, e.g., Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy
Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207 (2002) (using game theory to model different modes of
experimentation under which the central government cannot require particular policy experiments in
particular sub-units).
481. For citations, see infra Appendix 1-2. Again, "rejecting Celotex" means rejecting it in whole
or in part. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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Table C-Celotex & Pleading Standards
Notice Plausibility Fact
Alabama Nevada Colorado Arkansas
Alaska New Hamp. Dist. of California
Arizona New Jersey Columbia Delaware
Hawai'i N. Carolina Massachusetts Illinois
Idaho N. Dakota Nebraska Louisiana
Applying Iowa Ohio South Dakota Maryland
Celotex Kansas Rhode Island Wisconsin Pennsylvania





Georgia Oklahoma (Texas)... Connecticut
Indiana (Texas) Florida
Rejecting Kentucky Utah Missouri
New Mexico Virginia Oregon
New York _
These interactions do not imply any particular normative conclusion, but
they suggest that state policy choices on pleading and summary judgment are
sufficiently diverse to allow for fruitful investigation. Or, note that among the
fourteen states in which courts cited approvingly to Scott v. Harris on summary
judgment, the proportion of Celotex to non-Celotex states is roughly the same as
the proportion among all states.483 The empirics of Twombly and Iqbal may be
484 485
uncertain, but that does not mean that procedural data are never meaningful.
If such data are meaningful, only a political process can translate that meaning
into policy.
482. I have put Texas in parentheses to indicate the split among Texas courts-so one could study
a jurisdiction rejecting Celotex and applying plausibility by looking at a subset of Texas courts. See
supra note 127 (discussing split in Texas authority).
483. See supra Part II.A.2 (collecting cases). About 29 percent of the states applying Scott v.
Harris rejected Celotex, and approximately 25 percent of states rejected Celotex. The non-Celotex states
citing Scott are Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, and New Mexico. The Celotex states citing Scott are
Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.
484. See supra note 26.
485. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Can We Learn AnythingAbout Pleading Changes from Existing
Data?, 44 INT'L REV. L. EcoN. 72, 72 (2015) ("[Civil procedure] researchers should not let the perfect
be the enemy of the good: even data protocols that are less than perfectly designed may be broadly
useful.").
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Turning to state enforcement, Part III demonstrated that state executives
participate in policymaking through the exercise of their enforcement discretion.
Indeed, this Article demonstrates that public enforcement has the capacity to
respond precisely to the Supreme Court's procedural decisions that have
486generated the most political outcry. In this way, this Article also provides a
doctrinal template for public scrutiny of state-enforcement choices. 487
Theoretically, there are reasons that public-enforcement substitutes might
be an auspicious development. Public enforcement can be coordinated across
488cases or issues. It can select cases based on the interests of the polity rather
than the highest possible damage award or attorney fee.489 It might be easier to
name and shame the attorney general for underenforcement than to vote out a
legislator for sub-optimally incentivizing private suits. 490 And I have noted
throughout this Article examples of courts concluding that public enforcement is
not just a substitute but an improvement. 491 They could be right.
B. Reasons for Concern
Even for those troubled by the Supreme Court's recent procedural
retrenchment (and encouraged by the responses documented above), this paper
should not be read as an entirely happy story. The state-level developments
described in this paper are necessarily limited, and they raise new issues that are
not altogether encouraging.
First, as noted above, many factors constrain state procedure and public
enforcement. Federal jurisdiction, removal, and preemption blunt the effects of
state court decisions. 492 This is especially significant for the private enforcement
of federal statutory rights.493 Public suits can dodge some of these limits, but
resources, political will, and remedial options may hold back robust public
494enforcement. These limitations suggest that large swaths of cases are immune
486. See supra Part EE.
487. Id
488. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 462, (discussing this argument and collecting sources).
489. See id.
490. Zachary Price offered a similar structural account of the politics of enforcement discretion:
"In an era of partisan polarization and legislative gridlock, Presidents often cannot count on Congress to
develop legislative solutions to perceived problems, or even to negotiate over such solutions in good
faith. Nevertheless, the public increasingly holds the President accountable for all failures of national
policy." Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 687
(2014).
491. Recall that the Southern District of Georgia invited public enforcement against H & R Block
when private enforcement was not available, see supra note 313 and accompanying text, and the Fifth
Circuit suggested that a class waiver in an arbitration clause was less problematic because public
enforcement was available. See supra note 383 and accompanying text. Many courts have held that
public enforcement actions are "superior" to private class actions, and the legislature of Maryland
codified this preference for public suits over class actions. See supra note 312.
492. See supra Part II.E.
493. See id
494. See supra Part IL.F.
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from some or all of the responses described in this Article.495 To put it
affirmatively, critics of the Supreme Court's procedural decision will need to
demand significant legislative and executive action to make state responses fully
effective.
Rethinking these findings through the frame of politics also raises questions
of political economy. Turning first to state courts, we might expect that the
procedural nature of these issues insulates them from pure politics. To engage
with procedure, one needs to acquire technical expertise and professional
experience. But these features of procedure also make procedural politics less
transparent. If civil procedure scholars are not closely following the
developments of state procedural law,496 then it is doubtful that state procedure
is subject to anything close to intense public scrutiny. The technical nature of
procedure further hinders transparency, and simultaneously gives it an aura of
neutrality even if not warranted. Fragmenting procedure into fifty-plus
jurisdictions further challenges effective monitoring.497
In addition, the price of political influence in state courts is not high.498
Many states hold judicial elections, and although spending in these elections has
increased, it is still relatively low compared to other races.499 As a result, a few
interested parties could effectively influence state judicial politics.500 For
example, in one high profile case, an Atlanta billionaire allegedly attempted to
sway a judicial election in Montana-with an eye toward his pending business
in the state supreme court-for the (relatively) low price of $ 100,000.501
Judicial politics may not have a consistent ideological valence. It may be
that, in some areas, trial lawyers or other traditionally liberal groups could be
major players. But regardless of the policy outputs, there are democratic reasons
to temper optimism for the politics of state procedure. There also are empirical
reasons to think that campaign contributions can affect partisan judicial
elections. For example, Joanna Shepherd showed empirically the intuitive result
that "contributions from interest groups are associated with increases in the
495. These limits also suggest a cynical interpretation of courts' stated preferences for public
enforcement. See, e.g., supra notes 68, 312, 383, 414, 431-433 and accompanying text (collecting
examples of those stated preferences).
496. See supra Part I (collecting sources).
497. In future work, I attempt to overcome some of those challenges.
498. See, e.g., CHISUN LEE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SECRET SPENDING IN THE
STATES 3, 17-18 (2016) [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR. REPORT].
499. See, e.g., id at 3; Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme
Courts: The Empirical Relationship Between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision
Making, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S161, S165-66 (2015) (collecting sources and documenting correlation
between political party contributions and judicial behavior in partisan cases).
500. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, Capture and Governance at Local and
National Levels, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 135, 135 (2000) (noting the common view that "the lower the level
of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests, and the less protected minorities
and the poor tend to be").
501. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. REPORT, supra note 498, at 11 (describing case and citing
sources).
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probability that judges will vote for the litigants favored by those interest
groups.',502 Professors Kang and Shepherd also showed that "every dollar of
contributions from business groups is associated with increases in the probability
that elected judges will decide for business litigants." 503
Meanwhile, an understanding of public enforcement as law enforcement
may shield public enforcement from scrutiny.504 And yet, public enforcement
responses have the capacity to be even more political than court procedure.
Indeed, it would be quite surprising if some partisan executive officials were not
more political than federal judges with life tenure. Returning to an earlier
observation, even if public enforcement had sufficient resources (a big if),5o we
might worry that substituting public suits would systematically harm individuals
with claims against government actors or defendants with political sway.506 And,
again, the price is likely low.507 For example, according to the Utah State
Legislature, the State's attorney general appeared to have coordinated with
payday lenders to exchange leniency in public enforcement for about $450,000
in undisclosed campaign contributions.sos In short, therefore, when the Supreme
Court limits private enforcement, it undercuts a potential tool to check public
enforcement,509 not to mention a tool to increase enforcement and deterrence
overall.5 10
CONCLUSION
In sum, although the Supreme Court has been the fulcrum of this Article's
analysis, it is Congress that often sets the terms of procedural politics. When
Congress employs litigation as a tool of federal law enforcement, it necessarily
delegates some authority to courts to set enforcement standards.5 " When
Congress provides concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims, it impliedly
authorizes state judges to affect enforcement levels through procedure. When
502. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, andImpartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 629 (2009)
(studying contributions from pro-business groups, pro-labor groups, doctor groups, insurance
companies, and lawyer groups).
503. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69,73 (2011).
504. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (FOIA law enforcement exception).
505. See supra Part lIE.F.
506. Id
507. See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text.
508. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. REPORT, supra note 498, at 11-12 (describing this case and citing
sources); UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMrrrEE
(2014), http://le.utah.gov/investigative/FinalReport simple.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SR3-JRSR].
509. This is a tool that could be used by legislators or the public.
510. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
511. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 14, at 49-54.
512. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990) (observing that there is a "deeply rooted
presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction"); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR




Congress taps state attorneys general, it invites state executives into the
513
policymaking process.
This Article shows that state courts and enforcement agencies are important
sites for political contestation. Thus, when Congress involves state judges or
executives, it takes those judges and executives as it finds them-as political
animals, or at least as political actors.
513. See supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX 1
PLEADING CASES
State Accepting Rejecting Current Current Citation
Plausibility Plausibility Standard
Alabama Thomas v. Notice Gilley v. S.
Williams, 21 So. Research Inst., 176
3d 1234, 1236 n.1 So. 3d 1214, 1220
(Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. 2015).
2008).
Alaska NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Foondle v.
CASES CASES O'Brien, 346 P.3d
970, 973 (Alaska
2015).
Arizona Cullen v. Auto- Notice Coleman v. City of
Owners Ins. Co., Mesa, 284 P.3d
189 P.3d 344 863, 867 (Ariz.
(Ariz. 2008) (en 2012) (en banc).
banc).
Arkansas NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Duit Constr. Co.,




California NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Lee v. Hanley, 354
CASES CASES P.3d 334 (Cal.
2015).
Colorado Wamc v. Hall, Plausibility Warnc v. Hall, 373
373 P.3d 588, 595 P.3d 588, 595
(Colo. 2016) (en (Colo. 2016) (en
banc). banc).
Conn. NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact White v. Mazda
CASES CASES Motor of Am., Inc.
99 A.3d 1079,
1091 (Conn. 2014).






Dist. of Potomac Dev. Plausibility Poola v. Howard
Columbia Corp. v. District Univ., 147 A.3d
of Columbia, 28 267, 276 (D.C. Ct.
A.3d 531, 544 App. 2016).
(D.C. Ct. App.
2011).
Florida NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Berrios v. Deuk
CASES CASES Spine, 76 So. 3d
967, 970 n. 1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
Georgia Bush v. Bank of Notice Austin v. Clark,
N.Y. Mellon, 720 755 S.E.2d 796,
S.E.2d 370, 375 800 (Ga. 2014)




State Accepting Rejecting Current Current Citation
Plausibility Plausibility Standard
Hawal'i NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Kealoha v.
CASES CASES Machado, 315 P.3d
213, 216 (Haw.
2013).
Idaho NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Colafranceschi v.
CASES CASES Briley, 355 P.3d
1261 (Idaho 2015).
Illinois NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Hadley v. Doe, 34
CASES CASES N.E.3d 549, 556
(Ill. 2015).
Indiana NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Schmidt v. Indiana
CASES CASES Ins. Co., 45 N.E.3d
781, 786 (Ind.
2015).
Iowa Hawkeye Notice Hawkeye
Foodservice Foodservice
Distrib., Inc. v. Distrib., Inc. v.
Iowa Educators Iowa Educators
Corp., 812 Corp., 812 N.W.2d
N.W.2d 600, 608 600, 608 (Iowa
(Iowa 2012). 2012).
Kansas Smith v. State, No. Notice Berry v. Nat'l Med.
104,775, 2012 WL Servs., Inc., 257
1072756, at *6 P.3d 287, 288
(Kan. Ct. App. (Kan. 2011).
Mar. 23, 2012).
Kentucky NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Pete v. Anderson,
CASES CASES 413 S.W.3d 291,
301 (Ky. 2013).
Louisiana NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact McCarthy v.
CASES CASES Evolution Petrol.
Corp., 180 So. 3d
252, 257 (La.
2015).
Maine NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Marshall v. Town
CASES CASES of Dexter, 125
A.3d 1141, 1143
n.1 (Me. 2015).
Maryland NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Khalifa v.
CASES CASES Shannon, 945 A.2d
1244, 1256-57
(Md. 2008).
Mass. Iannacchino v. Plausibility Edwards v.
Ford Motor Co., Commonwealth, 76
888 N.E.2d 879, N.E.3d 248, 254
890 (Mass. 2008). (Mass. 2017).
Michigan NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Yono v. Dep't. of




Minnesota Walsh v. U.S. Notice Walsh v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 851 Bank, N.A., 851
N.W.2d 598, 603 N.W.2d 598, 603
(Minn. 2014). (Minn. 2014).
Miss. NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Scafidi v. Hille,
CASES CASES 180 So. 3d 634,
1 1_ 1 1 1650 (Miss. 2015).
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State Accepting Rejecting Current Current Citation
Plausibility Plausibility Standard
Missouri NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Sides v. St.
CASES CASES Anthony's Med.
Ctr., 258 S.W.3d
811, 823 (Mo.
1 2009) (en banc).
Montana Britz v. Metro. Notice Griffin v. Moseley,
Gen. Ins. Co., 285 234 P.3d 869, 877
P.3d 494, 500 (Mont. 2010).
(Mont. 2012).
Nebraska Doe v. Bd. Of Plausibility Funk v. Lincoln-
Regents of the Lancaster Cty.
Univ. of Neb., 788 Crime Stoppers,
N.W.2d 264, 278 Inc., 885 N.W.2d
(Neb. 2010). 1, 13-14 (Neb.
2016).
Nevada Garcia v. Notice Nutton v. Sunset
Prudential Ins. Co. Station, Inc., 357
of Am., 293 P.3d P.3d 966, 974
869, 871 n.2 (Nev. (Nev. 2015).
2013).
New NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice City of Keene v.
Hampshire CASES CASES Cleaveland, 118
A.3d 253, 263
(N.H. 2015).
New NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Major v. Maguire,
Jersey CASES CASES 128 A.3d 675,
689-90 (N.J.
2016).
New Madrid v. Vill. of Notice Deutsche Bank
Mexico Chama, 283 P.3d Nat'l. Trust Co. v.
871, 876 (N.M. Johnston, 369 P.3d
Ct. App. 2012). 1046, 1055 (N.M.
2016).
New York Krause v. Lancer Notice Davis v. S. Nassau
& Loader Grp., Cmtys. Hosp., 46
LLC, 965 N.E.3d 563, 572
N.Y.S.2d 312, 320 (N.Y. 2015).
n.3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2013).
North Holleman v. Notice Fussell v. N.C.
Carolina Aiken, 668 S.E.2d Farm Bureau Mut.
579, 584-85 (N.C. Ins. Co., Inc., 695
Ct. App. 2008). S.E.2d 437, 441-42
(N.C. 2010).
North NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice McColl Farms,
Dakota CASES CASES LLC v. Pflaum,
837 N.W.2d 359,
367 (N.D. 2013).
Ohio SPLIT SPLIT Notice State ex rel. Ohio
Civil Serv. Emps.
Ass'n. v. State, 56
N.E.3d 913, 918
(Ohio 2016).
Oklahoma Edelen v. Bd. of Notice State ex rel. Okla.
Comm'rs, 266 Corp. Comm'n v.
P.3d 660, 663 McPherson, 232




State Accepting Rejecting Current Current Citation
Plausibility Plausibility Standard
Oregon NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact McDowell
CASES CASES Welding &
Pipefitting, Inc. v.
U.S. Gypsum Co.,
193 P.3d 9, 17 (Or.
2008).
Penn. NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Bricklayers of W.
CASES CASES Pa. Combined
Funds, Inc. v.
Scott's Dev. Co.,
625 Pa. 26, 46 (Pa.
2014).
Rhode NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Chhun v. Mortg.
Island CASES CASES Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc., 84 A.3d
419, 421-22 (R.I.
2014).
South NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Fact Charleston Cty.




South Sisney v. Best Plausibility Hernandez v.
Dakota Inc., 754 N.W.2d Avera Queen of
804, 809 (S.D. Peace Hosp., 886
2008). N.W.2d 338, 344-
45 (S.D. 2016).
Tenn. Webb v. Nashville Notice Webb v. Nashville
Area Habitat for Area Habitat for
Humanity, Inc., Humanity, Inc.,
346 S.W.3d 422, 346 S.W.3d 422,
425 (Tenn. 2011). 425 (Tenn. 2011).
Texas SPLIT SPLIT Notice In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 590
(Tex. 2015).
Utah NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Am. W. Bank




Vermont Colby v. Notice Mahoney v. Tara,
Umbrella, 955 LLC, 107 A.3d
A.2d 1082, 1086 887, 892 (Vt.
n.1 (Vt. 2008). 2014).
Virginia NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Preferred Sys.




Wash. McCurry v. Chevy Notice McCurry v. Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB, Chase Bank, FSB,
233 P.3d 861 233 P.3d 861
(Wash. 2010) (en (Wash. 2010) (en
banc). banc).
West Roth v. Notice Roth v.
Virginia DeFeliceCare, DeFeliceCare, Inc.,
Inc., 700 S.E.2d 700 S.E.2d 183,
183, 189 n.4 (W. 189 n.4 (W. Va.
I Va. 2010). 1 2010).
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Wisconsin Data Key Partners Plausibility Data Key Partners
v. Permira v. Permira
Advisers LLC, Advisers LLC, 849
849 N.W.2d 693, N.W.2d 693, 699-
699-701 (Wis. 701 (Wis. 2014).
2014).
Wyoming NO DEFINITIVE NO DEFINITIVE Notice Ridgerunner, LLC
CASES CASES v. Meisinger, 297
P.3d 110, 114





State Rejecting Celotex (in Accepting Celotex Other Relevant
whole or part) Decisions
Alabama Exparte Gen. Motors Previously rejected:
Corp., 769 So. 2d 903 Berner v. Caldwell,
(Ala. 1999). 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala.
1989).
Alaska Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 Moffatt v. Brown, 751
P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska
2007). 1988) (criticizing
Liberty Lobby).
Arizona Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 802
P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990) (en
banc).
Arkansas Wallace v. Broyles, 961
S.W.2d 712 (Ark. 1998).
California Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Previously rejected:
Co., 24 P.3d 493 (Cal. Krantz v. BT Visual
2001) ("[W]e believe that Images, LLC, 107 Cal.
summary judgment law in Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct.
this state now conforms, App. 2001)
largely but not completely, (chronicling dispute
to its federal counterpart, among California
as clarified and liberalized courts).
in Celotex, Anderson, and
Matushita.").
Colorado Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v.
Keenan, 731 P.2d 708
(Colo.1987) (en banc).
Conn. Thomas v. A.O. Smith
Corp., No.
CV105029385S, 2012 WL
695550 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2012); Adams v. Laval,
CV126026706S, 2014 WL
7271874 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2012); Tangari v. Am.
Optical Corp., No.
CV065003634S, 2013 WL
6171421 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2013); Waste Conversion





Delaware Burkhart v. Davies, 602
A.2d 56 (Del. 1991).
Dist. of Claytor v. Owens-Corning
Columbia Fiberglass Corp., 662 A.2d
1374, 1381 (D.C. 1995);
Doe v. Safeway, Inc., 88
A.3d 131 (D.C. 2014);
Hollins v. Fed. Nat'l.
Mortg. Ass'n, 760 A.2d
563 (D.C. 2000).
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Florida SG's Car Sales, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't. of Law Enf't, 581
So. 2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 3d Dist. 1991); Byrd
v. BT Foods, Inc., 948 So.
2d 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
4th Dist. 2007); Lich v.
N.C.J. Inv. Co., 728 So. 2d
1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1999); Green v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 626 So.
2d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1st Dist. 1993) (per
curiam).
Georgia First Union Nat'l. Bank of
Ga. v. J. Reisbaum Co.,
378 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989); Hepner v. S.
Ry. Co., 356 S.E.2d 30
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
Hawai'i Ralston v. Yim, 92 P.3d
1276 (Haw. 2013).
Idaho Chandler v. Hayden, 215 G&M Farms v. Funk
P.3d 485 (Idaho 2009). Irrigation Co., 808
P.2d 851 (Idaho 1991)
(criticizing Liberty
Lobby).
Illinois Ganci v. Washington, 745
N.E.2d 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 2001); Hutchcraft v.
Indep. Mech. Indus., 726
N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. App. Ct.
4th Dist.'2000); Estate of
Henderson v. W.R. Grace
Co., 541 N.E.2d 805 (Ill.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1989);
Willett v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 851 N.E.2d 626 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006);
Jiotis v. Burr Ridge Park
Dist., 934 N.E.3d 514 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2014).
Indiana Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty.
Newspapers of Ind., Inc.,
644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.
1994); Dennis v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 831
N.E.2d 171 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005).
Iowa Wilson v. Darr, 553
N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa
1996); Griglione v. Martin,
525 N.W.2d 810, 813
(Iowa 1994).
Kansas Unified Sch. Dist. No. 232,
Johnson Cty. v. CWD
Invs., LLC, 205 P.3d 1245
_________ __________________(Kan. 2009). __________
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Kentucky Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
Louisiana Samaha v. Rau, 977 So. 2d Previously rejected:
880 (La. 2008) (based on Sassone v. Elder, 626
1997 amendments to La. So. 2d 345 (La. 1993)
Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. (superseded by
966 (2016)); Hardy v. amendments to La.
Bowie, 744 So. 2d 606 Code Civ. Proc. Ann.
(La. 1999) (same). (2016)).
Maine Corey v. Norman, Hanson
& DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933
(Me. 1999).
Maryland Beatty v. Trailmaster
Prods., Inc., 625 A.2d
1005 (Md. 1993); Yamaner
v. Orkin, 529 A.2d 361
(Md. 1987).
Mass. Kourouvacilis v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 716, 575
N.E.2d 734 (Mass. 1991).
Michigan Guinto v. Cross and Peters
Co., 547 N.W.2d 314
(Mich. 1996); McCart v. J.
Walter Thompson, Inc.,
469 N.W.2d 284 (Mich.
1991).
Minnesota DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566
N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1997).
Miss. Galloway v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 515 So. 2d 678, 683-
84 (Miss. 1987); Fruchter
v. Lynch Oil Co., 522 So.
2d 195 (Miss. 1988);
Ladnier v. Hester, 98 So.
3d 1025 (Miss. 2012).
Missouri ITT Commercial Fin. v.
Mid-Am. Marine Supply
Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371
(Mo. 1993) (en banc); see
also Powel v. Chaminade
Coll. Preparatory, Inc., 197
S.W.3d 576 (Mo. 2006)
(en banc).
Montana Monroe v. Cogswell
Agency, 234 P.3d 79
(Mont. 2010).
Nebraska Roskop Dairy, LLC v.
GEA Farm Techs., Inc.,
871 N.W.2d 776 (Neb.
2015); Anderson v. Serv.
Merch. Co., Inc., 485
N.W.2d 170 (Neb. 1992).
Nevada Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty.
Coll. Sys. of Nev., 172
P.3d 131 (Nev. 2007);
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Nevada Clauson v. Lloyd, 743 P.2d
(cont.) 631 (Nev. 1987); Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d
1026 (Nev. 2005).
New Pennichuck Corp. v. City
Hampshire of Nashua, 886 A.2d 1014
(N.H. 2005); Pennichuck
Corp. v. City of Nashua,
2004 WL 1950458 (N.H.
Super. Ct. 2004).
New Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Previously rejected
Jersey Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146 Liberty Lobby: Dairy
(N.J. 1995). Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel
Publ'g Co., 516 A.2d
220 (N.J. 1986).
New Romero v. Philip Morris
Mexico Inc., 242 P.3d 280 (N.M.
2010).
New York Yun Tung Chow v. Reckitt
& Colman, Inc., 950
N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring)
North Scarborough v. Dillard's Previously rejected:
Carolina Inc., 693 S.E.2d 640 (N.C. Metts v. Piver, 401
2011). S.E.2d 407 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1991).
North Rooks v. Robb, 871
Dakota N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 2015);
Steinbach v. State, 658
N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 2003).
Ohio Dresher v. Burt, 662
N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1996);
Wing v. Anchor Media,
Ltd. of Tex., 570 N.E.2d
1095 (Ohio 1991).
Oklahoma Iglehart v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm'rs, 60 P.3d 497
(Okla. 2002); Kating v.
City of Pryor ex rel. Mun.
Util. Bd. f Pryor, 977 P.2d
1142 (Okla. Civ. App.
1998).
Oregon Jones v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 939 P.2d 608 (Or.
1997).
Penn. Ertel v. Patriot-News Co.,
674 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 1996).
Rhode Lavoie v. N.E. Knitting,
Island Inc., 918 A.2d 225 (R.I.
2007).
South Baughman v. AT & T, 410
Carolina S.E.2d 537 (S.C. 1991).
South U.S. Bank Nat'l. Ass'n v.
Dakota Scott, 673 N.W.2d 646
(S.D. 2003); One Star v.
Sisters of St. Francis, 752
N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 2008).
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Tenn. Rye v. Women's Care Ctr., Previously rejected:
477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. Hannan v. Alltel
2015). Publ'g Co., 270
S.W.3d 1 (Tenn.
2008).
Texas Casso v. Brand, 776 Casso's objections to
S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989) Celotex were partially
(partially superseded by overruled by TEX. R.
TEX. R. CIv. P. 166a(i)); CIV. P. 166a(i), as
see also Huckabee v. Time amended in 1997.
Warner Entm't Co., L.P.,
19 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. 2000)
(criticizing Liberty Lobby).
Utah Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d
600 (Utah 2008); Harline
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433
(Utah 1996); see also
Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc.
v. Lowry, 284 P.3d 630
(Utah 2012).
Vermont Estate of Alden v. Dee, 35
A.3d 950 (Vt. 2011);
Poplaski v. Lamphere, 565
A.2d 1326 (Vt. 1989).
Virginia Realstar Realtors, LLC v.
Glenn ex rel. Smith, No.
CL99-186, 2001 WL
587489 (Va. Cir. Ct. May
23, 2001); Bhalala & Shah,
Inc. v. Quik Out Mkt., Inc.,
No. 131309, 1994 WL
1031171 (Va. Cir. Ct.
1004); Harleysville Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Capital GMC
Trucks, Inc., No. LT-2254-
2, 1993 WL 945924 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1993).
Wash. Young v. Key Pharm.,
Inc., 770 P.2d 182 (Wash.
1989) (en banc).
West Williams v. Precision Coil,
Virginia Inc., 459 S.E.2d 329 (W.
Va. 1995); Crain v.
Lightner, 364 S.E.2d 778
(W. Va. 1987).
Wisconsin Yahnke v. Carson, 613
N.W.2d 102 (Wis. 2000);
Transp. Ins. Co., Inc. v.
Hunzinger Constr. Co.,
507 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993).
Wyoming Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d Parker v. Haller, 751
588 (Wyo. 1999). P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1988)
(criticizing Liberty
Lobby).
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